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Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code trigger a sudden increase of federal tax 
liability when some attribute of a taxpayer—most commonly income—exceeds a 
particular threshold value. As a result, two taxpayers in nearly identical economic 
situations can face considerably different tax liabilities depending on which side of the 
triggering criterion they fall. The magnitude of the equity and efficiency costs 
associated with cliff effects is significant: cliff effects are attached to tax provisions 
amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, the majority of which are targeted at 
low- and moderate-income taxpayers. 
Cliff effects have received little attention in legal academia. Prior scholarship has 
primarily discussed the relevant tax provisions in isolation, focusing on financial 
consequences on a single taxpayer or limiting analysis to taxpayers in one geographic 
area. This Article addresses the void in legal scholarship by first recognizing potential 
rationales for cliff effects and identifying situations where their definitional clarity 
might compensate for any equity and efficiency losses. Next, the individual and aggregate 
costs of cliff effects are quantified and plausible statutory alternatives are identified. 
This Article argues that a cliff effect based on income is necessarily problematic 
on both equity and efficiency grounds because it improperly penalizes taxpayers and 
disincentivizes the economic empowerment the associated tax provision is intended to 
promote. A methodology is then provided by which these costs can be compared to the 
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potential savings provided by the bright-line rule of the cliff effect. This empirical 
analysis is performed on the two cliff effects of the health premium subsidy of the 
Affordable Care Act and finds that the cliff effects will, if unchecked, represent a 
misallocation of over $8.5 billion by 2025. 
This Article presents several options for replacing problematic cliff effects, including 
those in the health care subsidy. The most novel of these strategies awards a credit based 
on the severity of the cliff effect and ensures that no taxpayer is made worse off post-tax 
by virtue of earning more pre-tax income. The Article concludes by extending the analysis 
to cliff effects associated with state and local tax regimes and direct transfer programs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Code contains many credits, deductions, exclusions, 
and other benefits that apply when a taxpayer satisfies a certain numerical 
criterion, but that immediately vanish once this triggering criterion is no longer 
met. As a result, two taxpayers in nearly identical economic situations can face 
considerably different federal tax liabilities depending on which side of the 
triggering criterion they happen to fall. The “cliff effects” attached to these tax 
provisions can drastically affect taxpayer behavior and undermine what these 
provisions are intended to accomplish. The magnitude of this issue is 
significant: cliff effects, in one form or another, are attached to various federal 
tax expenditures totaling hundreds of billions of dollars.1 
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code have received little discussion 
in legal academia. Prior scholarship has mentioned cliff effects only in passing 
or focused solely on the financial consequences of specific tax provisions on 
individual taxpayers.2 Scant effort has been expended on quantifying the 
 
1 See infra note 14 and accompanying text. Unless stated otherwise, all section references in this 
Article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C. (2012)). 
2 See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006) (analyzing tax incentives generally and mentioning the existence 
of cliff effects and other “discontinuities” within various tax incentive structures); Seth J. Chandler, 
The Architecture of Contemporary Healthcare Reform and Effective Marginal Tax Rates, 29 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 335 (2010) (looking at the high marginal tax rates and the cliff effect of earning 400% of the 
federal poverty level associated with the Affordable Care Act and their potential effect on a family’s 
decisionmaking); Simon Friedman, Partnership Securities, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 521 (1993) (mentioning 
the possible consequences of a partner’s receipt of a capital interest, an option, and a profits interest 
for either cash or services, and the cliff effects in the tax treatment of a partnership); Stephen D. 
Holt & Jennifer L. Romich, Marginal Tax Rates Facing Low- and Moderate-Income Workers Who 
Participate in Means-Tested Transfer Programs, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 253 (2007) (modeling the marginal tax 
rates of families in Wisconsin by combining tax and public assistance schedules and citing instances 
in which a cliff effect exists); Robert A. Jacobs, Tax Treatment of Corporate Net Operating Losses and 
Other Tax Attribute Carryovers, 5 VA. TAX REV. 701 (1986) (discussing the Senate Finance 
Committee Staff “Green Book’s” criticism of the cliff effect in the law governing the taxation of net 
operating losses); Ira B. Shepard & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Recent Developments in Federal Income 
Taxation: The Year 2001, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 627 (2002) (discussing the cliff effects associated with the 
2001 changes to § 25B of the Internal Revenue Code regarding the tax treatment of individual 
retirement accounts and to § 222 regarding the college tuition deduction); Paul D. Trampe, The 
Effects of Combined Marginal Tax Rates on the Working Poor: Evidence from the Current Population Survey 
and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y no. 4, art. 7, 2011, at 1 
(examining the effect of losing benefits as a result of additional income on hours worked and finding 
a disincentive to work due to various phaseouts, cliff effects, and taxes); Lawrence Zelenak, Choosing 
Between Tax and Nontax Delivery Mechanisms for Health Insurance Subsidies, 65 TAX L. REV. 723 (2012) 
(discussing the tradeoffs between tax and nontax provisions in the ACA and mentioning the 
existence of the 400% federal poverty level cliff effect). 
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aggregate cost imposed by cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code on the 
public and on identifying plausible statutory alternatives. This Article 
addresses this void by examining the extent to which cliff effects in the 
Internal Revenue Code create problematic results for taxpayers and frustrate 
the intended goals of the tax provisions to which they are attached. The 
consequences of cliff effects at the state and local level, in both tax legislation 
and direct transfer programs, are also explored. The extent to which cliff effects 
are problematic is identified and quantified on both individual and aggregate 
microeconomic levels. Through this analysis, this Article proposes alternatives 
to the use of cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code that still limit the reach 
of the relevant subsidies but do so in a more equitable and efficient manner. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background information 
on cliff effects and discusses their use in the Internal Revenue Code. Part II 
assesses the burdens of cliff effects on equity and efficiency grounds, and 
provides a methodology by which the aggregate cost of cliff effects can be 
calculated. Part III applies the cost methodology to the particular cliff effects 
contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable 
Care Act”).3 Part IV proposes alternatives to cliff effects that reduce both 
inefficiencies and equity burdens and lessen their impact on low- to 
moderate-income taxpayers. Part V extends the analysis to include direct 
transfer programs administered by state and local governments. 
I. CLIFF EFFECTS AS LEGISLATIVE TOOLS 
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code represent a subset of the  
line drawing that occurs with respect to all governmental regulation. In order 
to measure, assess, proscribe, or tax behavior, that behavior must first be 
identified. This identification occurs by categorizing behavior into either 
regulated or unregulated conduct, which in turn occurs by line drawing at 
both state and federal levels. For example, a motorist in Connecticut is 
permitted to travel at sixty-five miles per hour on specified highways but 
sixty-six miles per hour is forbidden.4 Federal law permits a mercury level in 
drinking water of two parts per billion, but any greater level is prohibited.5 
Whereas line drawing in other regulatory contexts may result in a ticket or 
 
3 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1401–1402, 
124 Stat. 119, 213-24 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 36 (2012), id. § 280C, and 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012)); 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001, 124 Stat. 1029, 
1030-32 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 36B (2012)) [collectively, hereinafter Affordable Care Act]. 
4 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-218a(b), 14-219(a) (2015). 
5 Basic Information About Mercury (Inorganic) in Drinking Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/drink/contaminants/basicinformation/mercury.cfm [https://perma.
cc/AL92-JX23] (last updated Jan. 6, 2016). 
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revocation of some preferred status, line drawing in the Internal Revenue 
Code causes nearly identical taxpayers close to the threshold, on either side 
of the line, to incur varying amounts of tax liability. When the difference in 
tax liability is significant, the result is known as a cliff effect.6 
The term “cliff effect” is not a technical term and, as such, has no common 
definition. Qualitatively, a cliff effect exists when a differential change to some 
characteristic of an individual has significant economic consequences to that 
individual. In practice, the reference metric to which the cliff effect is attached 
is often, but not always,7 an income or asset level.8 For example, the cliff effects 
associated with the health premium credits of the Affordable Care Act 
reference “modified adjusted gross income”9 and the cliff effects associated 
with the Earned Income Tax Credit reference “investment income.”10 The 
consequence associated with a cliff effect is generally the sudden loss of some 
economic benefit.11 A cliff effect in the Internal Revenue Code occurs when a 
change in some characteristic of a taxpayer (or a third-party) results in a 
substantial increase in that taxpayer’s tax liability. A subset of cliff effects in the 
Internal Revenue Code are those based on the taxpayer’s income, where an 
additional amount of some category of a taxpayer’s income results in an increase 
in tax liability greater than the increase in income.12 These cliff effects, which 
 
6 See infra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. 
7 Examples of metrics other than income include the standards for tax-free reorganizations. For 
example, for a reverse triangular merger to qualify as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A), target 
shareholders must exchange stock constituting at least 80% of the voting stock of the parent. I.R.C. 
§§ 368(a)(2)(E), 368(c) (2012). Additionally, the credit for “qualified retirement savings 
contributions” precludes full-time students from eligibility for the credit. I.R.C § 25B(c)(2) (2012). 
This credit contains a cliff effect with respect to number of credit hours taken by students. INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., PUB. 571: TAX-SHELTERED ANNUITY PLANS (403(B) PLANS) 19 (Jan. 5, 2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p571.pdf [https://perma.cc/62JC-BSR4] (“You are a full-time 
student if you are enrolled for the number of hours or courses the school considers to be full-time.”). 
This credit also has two cliff effects with respect to adjusted gross income. See infra note 14. 
8 The reference income varies depending on the specific provision but could, for example, 
include gross income, adjusted gross income, modified adjusted gross income, net investment 
income, or some other form of income defined for that specific provision, such as provisional income 
and social security benefits. See infra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. Because its applicability 
depends on a taxpayer’s income level, a provision to which an income-based cliff effect is attached 
can be called a means-tested program. 
9 See I.R.C. § 36B(d)(2) (defining “household income” for purposes of the Affordable Care 
Act’s refundable credits as being primarily determined by “modified adjusted gross income”). 
Modified adjusted gross income is equal to adjusted gross income plus (1) any amount excluded from 
gross income under I.R.C. § 911 (i.e., the foreign earned income and foreign housing costs exclusions 
for U.S. citizens and residents living abroad), (2) any amount of tax-exempt interest received or 
accrued by the taxpayer during the tax year, and (3) the amount of the taxpayer’s social security 
benefits excluded from gross income. Id. § 36B(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(e)(2) (2015). 
10 See infra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
11 See, e.g., infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
12 It is not an overlooked irony that the cliff effects discussed in greatest detail in this Article 
are defined by a line drawing at a marginal tax rate of 100%. 
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leave some taxpayers economically worse off post-tax by earning income 
beyond the cliff effect threshold, are the central focus of this Article. Inherent 
in this definition of an income-based cliff effect is the existence of, for at least 
some portion of the additional income, a marginal tax rate greater than 100%.13 
A. Examples of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code 
There are numerous examples of cliff effects in the Internal Revenue 
Code.14 A recent example is found in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
 
13 Marginal tax rates are discussed in more detail in Section II.A, infra. A marginal tax rate in 
excess of 100% can occur from either an income-based cliff effect rendering a single tax provision 
suddenly inapplicable, or from two or more distinct tax provisions acting in concert such that the 
combined increase in tax liability results in a marginal tax rate greater than 100%. 
14 The § 25B Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (“Saver’s Credit”) provides a credit to 
taxpayers contributing to qualifying retirement accounts. I.R.C. § 25B (2012). The credit is equal to the 
amount saved (up to $2000 for a single filer or $4000 if married filing jointly) multiplied by either 50%, 
20%, 10%, or 0%, depending on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Id. § 25B(b). For a single filer the 
adjusted gross income ranges are: 50% for $0 to $18,250, 20% for $18,251 to $19,750, 10% for $19,751 to 
$30,500, and 0% for greater than $30,500. Id. 
Section 222 allows a deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses paid by a taxpayer, the 
amount of which depends entirely on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. See infra  
notes 28–34 and accompanying text. 
Publicly traded partnerships are normally treated as corporations subject to corporate taxes, but 
an exception is made where “90% or more of the gross income of such partnership for the taxable 
year consists of qualifying income” (including certain types of interest, dividends, real property 
rents, and gain from the sale of real property). I.R.C. § 7704(c)–(d). If the 90% income test is met, 
the partnership receives the more preferable pass-through treatment. Id. The partnership also 
receives an extension of time for the payment of estate tax where more than 35% of the adjusted 
gross estate consists of interest in a closely held business, which reduces an individual’s immediate 
tax liability and allows payment to be deferred for up to either five or ten years. Id. § 6166(a). 
A corporation may claim a deduction for dividends received from a foreign corporation if at 
least 10% of the stock of the foreign corporation is owned by the taxpayer and if the foreign 
corporation’s earnings include “U.S. earnings,” defined in part as “any dividend received . . . from a 
domestic corporation at least 80% of the stock of which . . . is owned . . . by the qualified  
10-percent owned corporation.” Id. § 245(a)(1), (5). 
Two cliff effects exist in the deductions taxpayers can claim for dependents. See § 152(d) (defining 
whom a taxpayer may classify as a “qualifying relative”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 501: 
EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING INFORMATION 1 (Dec. 20, 2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP6P-P62S] [hereinafter I.R.S. 501] 
(prohibiting deduction for a “qualifying relative” dependent if relative has greater than $3950 of income 
in 2014). Additionally, the taxpayer claiming a deduction for a qualifying relative must have provided 
more than 50% of the individual’s total support for the year. I.R.C. § 152(d). 
The Work Opportunity Tax Credit contains cliff effects for credits available to employers hiring 
members of certain targeted groups. Id. § 51. The business credit for employers is equal to 40% of 
the first $6000 (or $12,000, $14,000, or $24,000 in cases of certain qualified veterans) of qualified  
first-year wages paid to an employee who is a member of a targeted group and who works at least 
400 hours during the tax year, but only 25% of these wages for those who worked between 120 and 
400 hours, and 0% for employees who worked less than 120 hours. Id. 
Section 45P provides a tax credit to employers hiring employees who are active duty members 
of the uniformed services, but only for small businesses, with “small business” defined, in part, via 
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Care Act, which provides subsidies in the form of tax credits for certain health 
insurance plans purchased by individuals and families with incomes between 
100% and 400% of the federal poverty level.15 For a taxpayer with household 
income between 300% and 400% of the federal poverty level, the amount of the 
subsidy is equal to the excess of the cost of premiums for the benchmark health 
care plan above 9.5% of the taxpayer’s household income.16 An individual with 
a household income of $45,960 (exactly 400% of the federal poverty level) 
paying $7000 in insurance premiums will thus receive a credit of $2634.17 An 
individual earning one dollar more will, however, by virtue of earning more 
than 400% of the federal poverty level, receive no credit. This additional dollar 
of income, therefore, results in an increased tax liability of $2634. The marginal 
tax rate of this one additional dollar is, therefore, 263,400%.18 
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a refundable credit for low- to 
moderate-income taxpayers who earn their income by working.19 The credit, 
with an estimated cost of over $70 billion for 2015,20 is calculated as a 
percentage of earned income up to a maximum income level (depending on 
 
a cliff effect. Id. § 45P(b)(3)(A)(i) (limiting this credit to small businesses with “an average of less 
than 50 employees on business days”). 
A cliff effect also exists with respect to the tax treatment of businesses based on the average 
number of employees because a small business is defined as one that employs, on average, fewer 
than fifty persons throughout the year. Id. § 44(a). Section 44(a), which provides a credit to small 
businesses for expenditures providing access to disabled employees, contains a cliff effect with 
respect to the number of employees (thirty employees maximum) and hours per week the employee 
must work to qualify (thirty). Id. § 44(b). 
Finally, students may receive the “Hope Scholarship Credit” only if they are enrolled at least 
half of the year, creating a cliff effect with respect to credit hours. Id. § 25A(b)(2)(B). 
15 Taxpayers are eligible for the credit if they buy their health insurance on an exchange and 
are not eligible for other qualifying insurance. See generally id. § 36B. The federal poverty level in 
the forty-eight contiguous states for 2013 (the year to be used for purposes of the § 36B credit) for 
a family of one, two, three, and four people is $11,490, $15,510, $19,530, and $23,550, respectively. 
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182, 5183 (Jan. 24, 2013). 
16 I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). “Household income” is generally equal to the aggregate modified 
adjusted gross income of all individuals comprising the familial unit for which the credit is 
calculated. Id. § 36B(d)(2)(A). The benchmark plan is the “second lowest cost silver plan” available 
to the taxpayer. § 36B(b)(2)(B)(i). See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
17 $7000 minus 9.5% of $45,960 equals $2634. 
18 The marginal tax rate equals the increase in tax liability divided by additional income times 
100%. Here, $2634 ÷ $1 × 100% = 263,400%. See infra Section II.A. 
19 I.R.C. § 32; see also Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
790, 799 (2007) (“Low-income taxpayers are eligible for the earned income tax credit (EITC). The EITC 
is only available for ‘earned income’ such as wages. The EITC rewards work.” (footnotes omitted)). 
20 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 32 (Aug. 5, 2014). The Joint Committee’s estimates are not equivalent 
to government revenues foregone in the absence of the tax deductions because tax expenditure 
estimates do not take into account behavioral responses or changes in the timing of tax payments. 
See id. at 16 (“[T]ax expenditure calculations do not incorporate the effects of the behavioral changes 
that are anticipated to occur in response to the repeal of a tax expenditure provision.”). 
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family size) and is phased out as income increases.21 Taxpayers with more than 
a certain amount of investment income are not eligible for the Earned Income 
Tax Credit.22 For 2016, the maximum amount of investment income an 
Earned Income Tax Credit recipient may have is $3400.23 Earning between 
$0 and $3400 of investment income does not reduce the amount of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit beyond the phaseout rate applied to all income.24 
Assuming all other eligibility requirements are satisfied,25 in 2016 a married 
taxpayer with two qualifying children with an adjusted gross income of 
$19,000, including $3400 of investment income and $15,600 of earned income, 
will receive a federal Earned Income Tax Credit of $5572.26 But if this taxpayer 
earns one extra dollar of dividend, interest, or rental income, for example, she 
is precluded from receiving any Earned Income Tax Credit.27 
Cliff effects are not limited to credits. Section 222 provides an above-the-
line deduction for “qualified tuition and related expenses”28 that was 
estimated to cost approximately $700 million in 2013.29 For taxpayers whose 
adjusted gross income is less than $65,000, the maximum deduction allowed 
 
21 A phaseout, unlike a cliff effect, occurs when the increase in some metric decreases the 
subsidy in question by an amount resulting in a marginal tax rate of 100% or less. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 43(b) (phasing out the enhanced oil recovery credit); id. § 469(i)(3) (phasing out rental real estate 
exemption); id. § 848(b)(2) (phasing out the amortization allowance of specified policy acquisition 
expenses). The Earned Income Tax Credit is phased out as ordinary income increases. See id. 
§ 32(b)(1)(A) (identifying applicable Earned Income Tax Credit and phaseout percentages based on 
the number of children the taxpayer has). The Earned Income Tax Credit phaseout rate is 7.65%, 
15.98%, or 21.06% respectively. Id. 
22 Id. § 32(i). The maximum amount of investment income permitted is indexed for inflation. 
Id. § 32(j). 
23 Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
24 In 2016, the Earned Income Tax Credit phaseout rate for a married filer with two children 
begins at $23,740. Id. 
25 Other Earned Income Tax Credit eligibility criteria include, for example, a residency and 
age restriction for taxpayers without qualifying children. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring 
taxpayers without qualifying children to have had a “principal place of abode” in the United States 
for at least six months of the taxable year and to be between twenty-five and sixty-five years old to 
be eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit). 
26 See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615 (noting that the maximum credit amount for a 
taxpayer with two qualifying children is $5572). 
27 This last dollar of investment income has a marginal tax rate of 557,200%. See infra Section 
II.A. Marginal tax rate equals the increase in tax liability divided by additional income times 100%. 
Here, $5572 ÷ $1 × 100% = 557,200%. The cliff effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit with regards 
to investment income is to be contrasted to the phaseout of the Earned Income Tax Credit for 
increases in earned income. See I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)(A). 
28 Id. § 222(a). This provision has expired and been renewed three times; it was most recently 
renewed on December 19, 2014 to cover the 2014 tax year. See Tax Increase Prevention Amendments, 
Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 107(a), 128 Stat. 4013 (2014). 
29 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 37 (Feb. 1, 2013). 
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is $4000.30 For taxpayers with an adjusted gross income between $65,000 and 
$80,000 the maximum amount of the deduction is $2000.31 For adjusted gross 
incomes exceeding $80,000, even by $1, the deduction for qualified tuition and 
related expenses is denied completely.32 This provision has two cliff effects: 
one when adjusted gross income exceeds $65,000 and another when adjusted 
gross income exceeds $80,000. The financial impact of losing a deduction 
depends on the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.33 For example, if the taxpayer is 
in the 25% bracket, a $2000 deduction is worth $500.34 
B. Justifications for Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code 
Regulation requires drawing lines to determine to whom or what the 
regulation applies. This line drawing does not, however, mandate stark 
differences in treatment between those sitting closely to either side of the 
line. Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code as currently written 
nevertheless cause significant economic consequences to taxpayers in only 
slightly different economic positions. What, then, explains the prevalence of 
cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code? 
1. Cliff Effects Created by Bright-Line Rules 
The definitional clarity provided by bright-line rules in the Internal 
Revenue Code can create cliff effects. Tax provisions must somehow identify 
the subset of taxpayers who will be covered by the provision. A tax provision 
with a bright-line rule establishing eligibility divides taxpayers, by definition, 
into classifications that determine each class’ treatment under that provision. 
However, although a bright-line rule is simple to state and easy to follow,35 its 
simplicity is offset by the potential inequity faced by those nearest to its division 
where some taxpayers are subject to the tax provision and some are not.36 
Consider a tax-free reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), which 
states that the acquisition of the stock of a target corporation in exchange 
solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation is a tax-free 
 
30 I.R.C. § 222(b)(2)(B)(i). This adjusted gross income limit, as well as the ones following, are 
doubled for joint filers. 
31 Id. § 222(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
32 Id. § 222(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
33 A tax credit reduces tax liability dollar for dollar and is worth the same for every taxpayer; 
the value of a deduction of a fixed amount of dollars depends on each taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. 
34 This calculation assumes the same marginal tax rate for the income range over which the 
deduction occurs. The marginal tax rate on the dollar disqualifying the taxpayer from taking the 
deduction would therefore be 50,000%. See infra Section II.A. 
35 See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
36 When a cliff effect is based on some form of income, the cliff effect is a means-tested 
program. If the cliff effect is based on some other metric, a different categorization is made. 
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reorganization, provided that the acquiring corporation has “control” of the 
target corporation immediately after the transaction.37 For purposes of the 
tax-free reorganization, “control” means 80% of the voting power and 80% of 
all other stock.38 A cliff effect thus exists with respect to the voting power and 
the stock ownership post-acquisition, because if only 79% of the voting power 
is held by the acquiring corporation, then the acquisition becomes a taxable 
event. This cliff effect exists because of the definitional certainty needed for 
the term “control.” “Control” is a necessary condition for this form of tax-free 
reorganization;39 as such, the term must be clearly defined. 
Another example of a cliff effect used as a bright-line rule for purposes of 
categorization is found in the definition of a nonchild relative qualifying as a 
dependent.40 To be a “qualifying relative” entitled to an additional deduction, 
the qualifying relative must have earnings less than $3950.41 If the relative earns 
less than $3950 and meets the other requirements, the taxpayer gets the full 
deduction; if the relative earns $1 more than $3950, the relative is ineligible to be 
claimed as a dependent.42 This cliff effect exists because of the need to define, 
with certainty, who is and is not classified as a dependent. The use of a cliff 
effect with respect to the income of a qualifying relative establishes a bright-line 
rule which provides definitional clarity because classification as a dependent is 
binary and does not exist as a continuous function: a nonchild relative either is 
or is not a qualifying relative. Because the Internal Revenue Code does not 
provide a partial deduction for partially qualifying dependents, the bright-line 
rule creates a cliff effect with respect to the income of the nonchild relative. 
Using cliff effects to provide definitional clarity says nothing about the 
propriety of the definition itself, however. Consider a tax credit providing a 
$100 credit to all taxpayers shorter than six feet tall. Such a provision might be 
normatively flawed,43 but the associated cliff effect with respect to height 
provides clarity about who will receive the credit. Provided that the  
tax-preferred group or status is worth defining precisely, the cliff effect attached 
to the term can be effective. In other words, from a policy standpoint, providing 
definitional certainty is more valuable than the cliff effect that is created. 
However, it is important to recognize that cliff effects are not a necessary 
result of these classifications. Indeed, not all bright-line rules in the Internal 
 
37 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). 
38 Id. § 368(c). 
39 Id. §§ 354(a)(1); 368(c). 
40 Id. § 152(d). A “qualifying relative” must also meet certain relationship and support tests. 
Id. §§ 152(d)(1), (2); I.R.S. 501, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.5. 
41 This amount is for the 2013 tax year. See I.R.S. 501, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.5. 
42 I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(B); I.R.S. 501, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.5. 
43 But see N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case 
Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution, AM. ECON. J., Feb. 2010, at 155 (positing that tall people, 
by virtue of their greater lifetime earnings, should pay more in taxes). 
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Revenue Code create cliff effects. Consider the income tax brackets of the 
individual income tax. For single filers, there are seven rates that apply over the 
range of an individual’s income.44 The tax rates within each bracket are devoid of 
ambiguity. Transitioning from one tax bracket to the next by earning more 
income results in a greater marginal tax rate, but not one greater than 100% since 
only this additional income is taxed at the higher rate. As a result, there is no cliff 
effect with regard to the bright-line rules associated with income tax brackets. 
This can be contrasted with bright-line rules conferring binary eligibility 
or ineligibility for a tax benefit based on income.45 Assuming the tax benefit 
in question is greater than the increase in income triggering the ineligibility 
for the benefit, this bright-line rule necessarily creates a cliff effect. 
Nevertheless, proponents of bright-line rules implicitly accept cliff effects as 
an acceptable consequence of providing definitional clarity.46 
2. Cliff Effects Based on Income Used as a Proxy for Other Metrics 
Sometimes a cliff effect attached to a taxpayer’s income is not intended to 
divide taxpayers into categories by income but rather to categorize taxpayers 
by some other criterion to which the reference income is correlated. In other 
words, the reference income is a proxy for some other metric which is more 
difficult to measure. 
The cliff effect associated with the Earned Income Tax Credit, for 
example, limits a taxpayer’s investment income.47 From a purely economic 
perspective, there is no difference between income earned from wages and 
income earned from investment. Even though the Earned Income Tax Credit 
incentivizes working by increasing the value of hours worked, this does not 
imply a cap on investment income is necessary. If the cliff effect associated 
with the Earned Income Tax Credit is intended to only divide taxpayers into 
 
44 For 2015, the taxable income brackets and rates for single filers are: $0 to $9225 (10%); $9225 to 
$37,450 (15%); $37,450 to $90,750 (25%); $90,750 to $189,300 (28%); $189,300 to $411,500 (33%); $411,500 to 
$413,200 (35%); and greater than $413,200 (39.6%). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 
2015, at 102 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf  [https://perma.cc/6QD4-FB7B]. 
45 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
46 See, e.g., Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search and 
Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (“The development of bright-line rules 
in search and seizure cases helps law enforcement officials as well as trial and appellate courts. Police 
officials can more easily instruct officers in broad, clear-cut terms as to the legal procedures for 
conducting searches and seizures. Trial judges can more easily apply bright-line rules in deciding 
cases. Appellate courts can expect fewer appeals seeking clarification of search and seizure law.”); 
Richard J. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and Circumstances Tests, and Complexity in Federal Taxation, 46 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1287, 1288 n.1 (1996) (“Rules like section 162(e) . . . serve as ‘bright lines’ to 
various degrees in that once the taxpayer meets their stated and often numerically precise 
definitional elements, the result follows without controversy.”). 
47 See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text. 
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low-income, benefit-receiving taxpayers and higher-income,  
nonbenefit-receiving taxpayers, it does so ineffectively. A taxpayer with 
$19,000 of earned income and $5000 of investment income is not eligible for 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, despite being in a worse pre-tax economic 
position than a taxpayer eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit with 
$25,000 of earned income.48 The taxpayer earning $19,000 of earned income 
and $5000 of investment income is also in a worse post-tax economic position 
than a taxpayer with just $19,000 of earned income. Post-tax, the taxpayer 
with only $19,000 of earned income receives an Earned Income Tax Credit of 
$5572, whereas the taxpayer with $19,000 of earned income and $5000 of 
investment income receives no Earned Income Tax Credit.49 
The cliff effect associated with the Earned Income Tax Credit is not, 
however, intended to measure income but to serve as a proxy for a taxpayer’s 
level of assets: in 1995, Leslie Samuels, then-Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy 
for the Department of Treasury, testified to the House Ways and Means 
Committee that the cap on investment income comes from a belief that “it is 
inappropriate to provide the Earned Income Tax Credit to taxpayers with assets 
which can generate $1000 of investment income.”50 A taxpayer earning 
investment income is assumed to have assets that far exceed the value of the 
income generated from those assets. Because the Earned Income Tax Credit 
exists both to incentivize working and as an antipoverty measure,51 Congress 
wanted to limit receipt of the Earned Income Tax Credit to taxpayers without 
substantial assets. Because the Internal Revenue Service does not collect 
information on taxpayers’ assets, applying a strict asset test is perceived as 
administratively difficult.52 As a result, Congress used the investment income 
test to approximate a taxpayer’s level of assets. Thus, Congress accepted a cliff 
 
48 These numbers assume the taxpayer has at least one qualifying child. Analogous income 
amounts exist for taxpayers with no qualifying children. 
49 Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
50 Earned Income Tax Credit Before the Subcomms. On Oversight & Human Res. of the H. Comm. 
on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 37 (1995) (testimony of Assistant Secretary Leslie B. Samuels). The 
limit on investment income for the Earned Income Tax Credit was put into effect in 1995. Act of 
Apr. 11, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 4(a), 109 Stat. 93, 95 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 32(i) (2012)). 
51 The first incarnation of the Earned Income Tax Credit was as a welfare reform proposal that 
would have helped working poor, two-parent families with children by means of a federal minimum 
cash guarantee that would have replaced the federal–state welfare program of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children. CHRISTINE SCOTT & MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL31768, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): AN OVERVIEW 21 
(2014); see also id. at 17 (“The EITC is one of the federal government’s largest anti-poverty programs 
reflecting a trend toward reducing poverty through the tax code.” (footnote omitted)). 
52 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2014 TO 2023, at 
139 (2013)(“[A]sset tests would be very difficult for the Internal Revenue Service . . . to administer 
because the agency does not collect information on the amount of assets held by individuals.”). 
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effect based on income in an effort to give a tax benefit to taxpayers who gained 
income by working instead of from investment. 
3. Cliff Effects as Cost Savings Measures 
A cliff effect in the Internal Revenue Code based on income creates a 
maximum income above which a certain tax benefit is eliminated. In doing so, 
the cliff effect establishes an income eligibility for the benefit: taxpayers earning 
less than the cliff effect threshold receive the benefit, while taxpayers earning 
more than the threshold do not. The immediate elimination of the benefit at the 
cliff effect threshold reduces the cost of the tax provision since, in the absence of 
the cliff effect, more taxpayers would receive the benefit. The same cost savings 
could be achieved with a phaseout—a gradual reduction in the benefit starting at 
some income level prior to the cliff effect threshold—but this would result in a 
benefit loss to taxpayers earning less than the cliff effect threshold.53 
The cost reduction of a cliff effect is more easily determined than a cost 
reduction from a gradual phaseout. Computationally, the cost of a benefit 
ending immediately at a specific income is easier to calculate than a benefit that 
varies as a function of income level. Unlike the Joint Committee on Taxation’s 
tax expenditure estimates, revenue estimates published by the Joint Committee 
explicitly take into account behavioral effects.54 As a result, the revenue estimate 
of a tax provision utilizing a phaseout is more computationally complex. 
Accurate revenue estimates are increasingly important when Congress is 
bound by the rules of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) budgeting, as it has been since 
2010.55 With respect to tax legislation, the PAYGO rules dictate that any 
provision reducing revenue must be offset by a corresponding legislative change 
increasing revenue or decreasing spending.56 If a given tax benefit’s only obstacle 
to passage is its nonconformance with PAYGO rules, a simple way to reduce the 
provision’s cost is to preclude its applicability above a certain income threshold. 
Cliff effects thus make the economic implications of a tax provision easier to 
calculate, which makes compliance with PAYGO easier for Congress to achieve. 
 
53 See infra Section IV.B. 
54 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING PROCEDURES AND 
METHODOLOGIES USED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 3 (Feb. 2, 2005) 
(“[F]or more than a quarter of a century, Joint Committee staff revenue estimates have taken into 
account taxpayers’ likely behavioral responses to proposed changes in tax law.”); see also supra note 20. 
55 Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (2010) (to be codified 
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 931–939). 
56 See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One% Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1385, 1436 (2011) (“The basic idea of PAYGO budgeting is straightforward: It requires that additional 
spending (or reductions in revenue) that exceed a target budget be ‘paid for’ either by offsetting 
decreases in spending or increases in revenue.”). 
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4. Cliff Effects Used in Politicking 
Attaching a tax benefit to a cliff effect creates a clearly defined demographic 
that profits from the benefit, which may be politically advantageous for either a 
proponent or opponent of a particular tax provision. For example, the deduction 
for qualified tuition and related expenses found in § 222 was touted as a 
provision that would benefit parents struggling to send their kids to college.57 In 
his remarks supporting this provision, Senator Chuck Grassley described the 
deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses as “a beneficial tax incentive 
for the middle class.”58 The fact that the provision is entirely eliminated for 
taxpayers earning $1 more than $80,000 demonstrates that the intended 
beneficiaries of § 222 were really moderate-income taxpayers.59 Similarly, while 
defending the Affordable Care Act during a 2012 debate against Mitt Romney, 
President Obama reiterated that the legislation was an integral part of “making 
sure that middle-class families are secure.”60 
This political salability can be lost when the benefit extends to taxpayers 
in certain groups not necessarily considered as deserving beneficiaries, or 
when the beneficiaries themselves are hard to define. It is simpler to convey 
that a tax provision is solely for, say, small business owners, if the tax benefit 
in question is immediately eliminated for businesses employing greater than 
some set number of employees. For example, the Small Business Health Care 
Tax Credit subsidizes premiums for small businesses but only if the small 
business has twenty-five or fewer employees.61 If these provisions instead 
utilized a phase out, some portion of the benefit would extend to businesses 
with greater than twenty-five employees, making the demographic incidence 
of the benefit more difficult to succinctly state. By using a cliff effect, then, 
the proponents of a tax provision make advocating for its passage simpler by 
allowing them to clearly state who will benefit from it (and who will not). 
C. Cliff Effects in State and Local Tax Regimes and Direct Transfer Programs 
Cliff effects are not limited to the Internal Revenue Code. Many federal 
direct spending programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
 
57 See 150 CONG. REC. S541 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2004) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“For parents 
struggling to send their children to college, the tuition tax deduction has been very important.”). 
58 Id. 
59 See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
60 Transcript of the First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/10/03/us/politics/transcript-of-the-first-presidential-debate-in-denver.html?r=0 [https://perma.cc/
H8LC-WDQL]. 
61 I.R.C. § 45R(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
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(TANF),62 Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937 (Section 8),63 and 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),64 incorporate  
means- or asset-based tests to assess eligibility. Although these programs are 
federally funded, states are given wide latitude in determining eligibility 
criteria.65 Not only does the eligibility criteria vary based on the applicant’s 
familial composition, but amounts received under one program can affect 
benefits received under another.66 The result is a complicated patchwork of 
income levels at which significant benefits are reduced or eliminated 
completely, often unbeknownst to the taxpayer until the benefit is lost.67 
Cliff effects with respect to the sudden loss of a nontax benefit—as opposed 
to cliff effects associated with a sudden increase in tax liability—do not 
technically involve marginal tax rates because they do not involve the increase 
or decrease of a tax liability. TANF, Section 8, and SNAP, for example, are not 
tax benefits. To be sure, the sudden ineligibility for these programs poses an 
economic burden to the recipient, but not a burden connected to a tax liability. 
Analyzing cliff effects related to state and local tax regimes and direct transfer 
programs, as well as federal tax liabilities, requires looking at how changes in 
income affect a taxpayer’s entire economic position. This means taking into 
account the federally funded direct transfer programs discussed above,68 as well 
as state and local tax laws and state-provided benefits such as child care and 
insurance. Because nontax benefits can comprise an important part of a 
taxpayer’s economic well-being, assessing only the change in a taxpayer’s 
federal tax liability paints an incomplete picture of the taxpayer’s financial 
 
62 TANF was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). TANF is best known for helping states pay 
for cash welfare for needy families with children, but it also funds a wide variety of additional 
activities. See generally GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32748, THE TEMPORARY 
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: A PRIMER ON TANF FINANCING 
AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS (Apr. 2, 2013). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012); see also Zachary Bray, The New Progressive Property and the Low-Income 
Housing Conflict, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1109, 1129 (“[Section 8 is a] broad program of federal tenant-based 
assistance for low-income households to obtain rental housing in the private housing market.”). 
64 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036c (2012); see also Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV. (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap 
[https://perma.cc/7NFR-56BK] (“SNAP offers nutrition assistance to millions of eligible, low-
income individuals and families and provides economic benefits to communities.”). 
65 See FALK, supra note 62, at 14 (noting that states may determine income eligibility standards, 
amount paid to families, and other conditions and criteria for eligibility under TANF). 
66 See infra notes 203–15 and accompanying text. 
67 See IND. INST. FOR WORKING FAMILIES, THE CLIFF EFFECT: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO 
STEPS BACK 9 (Oct. 2012), http://www.incap.org/documents/iiwf/2012/Cliff%20Effect.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M9UC-68JE] (describing cliff effects and how they prevent families from achieving 
economic self-sufficiency); Mary A. Prenovost & Deborah C. Youngblood, Traps, Pitfalls, and 
Unexpected Cliffs on the Path Out of Poverty, POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y, no. 2, 2010, at 53, 64-65 (providing 
anecdotal data on the unforeseen loss of benefits due to wage increases for women in Boston). 
68 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
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health. For this analysis an “effective” marginal tax rate69 must be employed 
which takes into account both tax and nontax effects due to changes in income. 
Expanding the analysis of cliff effects to include transfer programs outside of 
the Internal Revenue Code is explored more fully in Part VI. 
II. ASSESSING THE BURDEN OF CLIFF EFFECTS 
Tax legislation is often evaluated with reference to equity, efficiency, and 
simplicity.70 The principle of equity appeals to the notion that tax provisions 
should be applied fairly—similarly situated taxpayers should not be subjected 
to widely varying tax treatment.71 Efficiency dictates that tax provisions 
should accomplish their stated goals with minimum costs to taxpayers and 
alter taxpayer behavior that is unrelated to the goals of the provision as little 
as possible.72 Simplicity refers to the desire that tax provisions be  
easily understood and obeyed.73 
These principles overlap to a certain extent.74 For example, an 
unnecessarily complex tax provision is inefficient because additional resources 
are required for compliance; as a result, simplicity is often viewed as a feature 
of any tax system that is both equitable and efficient.75 An inequitable tax 
provision could incentivize taxpayers to change their behavior to lessen the 
severity of the inequity. In this regard, violations of equity can be considered 
inefficient to the extent they induce behavioral changes in taxpayers in ways 
unrelated to the aims of the provision involved.76 
 
69 The term “effective marginal tax rate,” as introduced here, covers both tax and nontax effects 
and could be characterized as an improper term. The terseness of the term, in this author’s view, 
adequately compensates for the loss of literality. 
70 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that there is widespread agreement that equity, 
efficiency, and simplicity are the criteria to be used when evaluating taxes). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 28. 
73 Id. at 27. 
74 See Batchelder et al., supra note 2, at 42 n.79 (“It is worth noting that these principles overlap 
to some degree. For instance, redistribution can be efficient if individuals gain utility from it even 
if they do not financially gain from it. Effectively, redistribution then creates positive externalities.”). 
75 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 70, at 29. Simplicity can be divided into three categories: 
(1) compliance complexity (doing what the law requires), (2) transactional complexity (arranging 
one’s affairs for optimal tax treatment), and (3) rule complexity (understanding what the law is). Id. 
at 30; see also DAVID BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 (1986). 
76 See Bradley T. Borden, Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 971, 983 (2013) (“[T]he generally accepted tension between equity and efficiency [is that] as 
one decreases, the other appears to increase.”). 
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A. The Relationship Between Marginal Tax Rates and Cliff Effects 
A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate is the rate at which that taxpayer’s last dollar 
of income is taxed.77 A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, in contrast to a taxpayer’s 
average tax rate, is an effective indicator of how the Internal Revenue Code 
affects a taxpayer’s decisions.78 Consider a taxpayer with two children who 
values her current leisure time at $12 per hour. In the absence of taxes, she 
would take employment as long as her wage was greater than $12 per hour. If 
the taxpayer has a marginal tax rate of 40%, however, her wage must be at 
least $20 per hour to properly incentivize working.79 Therefore, the taxpayer’s 
average tax rate is less relevant than her marginal tax rate for assessing the 
benefit of her potential employment. 
A taxpayer’s marginal tax rate can be negative if an additional dollar earned 
reduces the taxpayer’s tax liability. For example, during the phasein of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, each additional dollar of income yields this taxpayer 
an additional forty cents of credit. Thus, a single taxpayer with two qualifying 
children with a taxable income of $10,000 is in the 15% tax bracket but has a 
marginal tax rate of negative 25% for an additional dollar of earned income.80 
Marginal tax rates are commonly associated with federal income tax 
brackets.81 But the increase or decrease of federal income tax liability is affected 
by more than just income tax brackets. Tax expenditures—any tax provision that 
provides for a special credit, deduction, exclusion from income, or preferential 
rate, thus costing the government money in lost tax income and altering an 
individual’s tax liability—are intentional deviations from the baseline federal 
income tax that affect tax liability.82 Cliff effects attached to tax expenditures 
 
77 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 70, at 24. 
78 A taxpayer’s average rate of taxation is equal to her total tax liability divided by her  
total income. Id. 
79 For a wage of $20 per hour, the taxpayer’s after-tax pay equals 60% of $20 per hour, or $12 
per hour. This analysis omits other costs associated with working, such as transportation, child care, 
etc. As a result, the true rate at which a worker’s wages are reduced from gross pay to net pay is 
typically higher than the marginal tax rate. 
80 See Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Announces 2015 Tax Brackets, Standard Deduction Amounts and 
More, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/10/30/
irs-announces-2015-tax-brackets-standard-deduction-amounts-and-more/ [https://perma.cc/PQB7-
GRA7] (summarizing tax brackets, deduction, exemption, and credit amounts for 2015). The forty 
cents of credit that the taxpayer receives is offset by the 15% income tax on the additional dollar, 
such that the taxpayer gains a total of $1.25 ($1 of income plus $0.25 in credit). 
81 The tax rates of income brackets are the rates at which the income within those brackets is taxed, 
i.e., marginal tax rates. For 2015, the highest income tax bracket is 39.6%. Id. 
82 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 
§ 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (1974) (defining “tax expenditures” as “revenue losses attributable to 
provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from 
gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
liability”); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 2 (using the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to define tax expenditures). 
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drastically affect a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate profile: as illustrated earlier, a 
taxpayer with two children earning $3401 of investment income in 2016 loses 
$5572 of Earned Income Tax Credit from her last dollar of investment income 
despite being in a 15% income tax bracket.83 This last dollar of investment income 
therefore has a marginal tax rate of 557,200%.84 
However, describing cliff effects using solely marginal tax rates can paint an 
incomplete picture of the effect. Marginal tax rates are often calculated over 
income bands larger than $1.85 This practice masks the severity of the cliff effect.86 
For example, if the cliff effect associated with the premium reimbursement 
subsidy of the Affordable Care Act were calculated over an income band of $100, 
the severity of the cliff would be reduced by two orders of magnitude.87 
Although a cliff effect has implications for income earned beyond the effect’s 
threshold, a marginal tax rate greater than 100% exists only at the cliff effect 
threshold. Returning to the Earned Income Tax Credit example,88 the taxpayer’s 
next dollar of investment income after passing the cliff effect would increase her 
tax liability by only fifteen cents.89 After the taxpayer experiences the cliff effect, 
her marginal tax rate returns to 15%—the tax rate of her income tax bracket. Yet 
the force of the cliff effect lingers over a much larger range of income. Assuming 
the taxpayer’s additional income remains in the 15% bracket, she would need to 
earn approximately $6555 more before she returned to the economic position she 
was in prior to the cliff effect.90 For a taxpayer with yearly wages of $19,000, or 
$9.50 per hour, this is equivalent to an extra 690 hours of work. 
Thus, while the existence of a cliff effect is evidenced by a marginal tax rate 
greater than 100%, the severity of the cliff effect depends on how additional 
income above the cliff effect threshold is treated. The more favorably the 
 
83 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
84 Marginal tax rate equals the increase in tax liability divided by additional income times 
100%. Here, $5572 ÷ $1 × 100% = 557,200%. 
85 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES FOR LOW- AND 
MODERATE-INCOME WORKERS 4 (Nov. 2012) (using $100 bands of income to  
calculate marginal tax rates). 
86 “Marginal” tax rates calculated using bands of income greater than $1, though perhaps 
computationally expedient, mask the consequences of a cliff effect. This is because the cliff effect is 
triggered by just one additional dollar within the income band. As a result, the marginal tax rate for 
the dollar triggering the cliff effect is much higher. 
87 Marginal tax rate equals the increase in tax liability divided by additional income times 100%. 
Here, $2634 ÷ $100 × 100% = 2634%. See also supra note 18 (finding that the marginal tax rate in a 
similar situation, using an income band of $1, is 263,400%). 
88 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
89 See Erb, supra note 80. 
90 $6555 minus ($6555 × 15%) = $5572. For simplicity, this calculation assumes a total marginal tax 
rate of 15%, ignoring other costs to earning, such as the employee share of the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA), which is 6.2%. Social Security & Medicare Tax Rates, U.S. SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html [https://perma.cc/LS7G-S8BR] (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2016); see also I.R.C. § 3101(a) (2012) (imposing a 6.2% tax on all wages). 
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taxpayer’s subsequent income is taxed, the less the taxpayer must earn before 
returning to the economic position she was in prior to the cliff effect. Returning 
to the Earned Income Tax Credit example,91 if the taxpayer’s investment income 
were somehow excluded from income (such as the interest from tax-exempt 
bonds92), she would need to receive only $5572 in additional income (rather than 
$6555) to recoup the money lost as a result of the cliff effect. The magnitude of 
the impact a cliff effect has on an individual taxpayer, then, must be analyzed not 
just using the marginal tax rate for the first dollar earned beyond the cliff effect 
but also by examining how much additional income the taxpayer would need to 
earn to offset the additional tax liability imposed on the taxpayer as a result of 
the cliff effect. As demonstrated in the example above, the financial impact of 
cliff effects on taxpayers may be extremely burdensome. 
B. Cliff Effects and Financial Planning 
Highly variable marginal tax rates make optimal financial planning 
difficult. The marginal tax rates imposed on a single taxpayer with one child 
as a function of earned income are shown in Figure 1. The graph shown in 
Figure 1 is based on the Internal Revenue Code from 2012 and depicts a 
taxpayer affected by only three federal tax provisions: basic income tax rates, 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the child tax credit. 
 
Figure 1: Marginal Income Tax Rates for a  
Single Parent with One Child93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because the Earned Income Tax Credit is a refundable credit, the first 
dollars earned by the household puts them in a marginal tax rate bracket of 
 
91 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
92 See I.R.C. § 103 (excluding interest earned on state and local bonds from taxable income). 
93 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 85, at 6 fig.2. Figure 1 assumes that the taxpayer is 
single with one dependent child. For simplicity, the household’s income is derived entirely from 
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negative 34%. As the household continues to earn, the combination of the 
phaseout of the Earned Income Tax Credit, the phasein and phaseout of the 
child tax credit, and the start of the 10% tax bracket create eight distinct 
marginal tax rates (negative 34%, negative 49%, negative 15%, 0%, 10%, 25.98%, 
30.98%, 15%, and 26%) before the household has earned $75,000. As the 
household’s income surpasses the income limits for the various benefits, the 
household’s marginal tax rate becomes aligned with the standard federal tax 
bracket of 15%. Minor details regarding phasein and phaseout points for the 
various tax provisions have changed since 2012, but the conclusion drawn from 
Figure 1 remains the same: the taxpayer depicted in Figure 1 has a complicated 
patchwork of varying marginal tax rates over her range of income, which makes 
it difficult for the taxpayer to plan her finances prospectively when even an 
additional $1 of income can have a major effect on her tax liability. 
 
Table 1: Required Wage to Properly Incentivize Working94 
 
Marginal Tax Rate Starting Income Final Income Required Wage 
per Hour 
-34% $0 $3000 $8.96 
-49 3000 9000 8.05 
-15 9000 10,000 10.54 
0 10,000 17,000 12.00 
10 17,000 18,000 13.33 
25.98 18,000 29,000 16.21 
30.98 29,000 37,000 17.64 
15 37,000 65,000 14.12 
26 65,000 Above 16.22 
 
The net economic benefit to the taxpayer from each additional dollar earned 
varies widely over the taxpayer’s income range. This variation in the taxpayer’s 
marginal tax rate profile makes optimal financial planning difficult because the 
after-tax value of her labor is constantly changing.95 If, as in the previous example, 
 
wages and the taxpayer has itemized deductions worth 18% of income and claims the greater of those 
deductions or the standard deduction (40% of the itemized deductions are assumed to be state and 
local taxes, and the rest are charitable contributions and mortgage interest). Id. 
94 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 85, at 6 fig.2 (providing marginal tax rates for the 
relevant income ranges). Because we are interested in the taxpayer’s net economic position, we consider 
wages on a post-tax basis. The hourly wage required to incentivize working is equal to $12 divided by (1 
minus marginal tax rate). For a negative 34% marginal tax rate, for example, the required hourly wage is 
$12 divided by (1 minus (negative 34%)) = $8.96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
95 This analysis is particularly relevant to married taxpayers with children deciding if one 
parent should enter the workforce. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look 
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the household values its leisure at $12 per hour, the required hourly wage to properly 
incentivize working varies as the marginal tax rate varies, and is shown in Table 1. 
Notwithstanding that the household’s valuation of leisure likely varies over 
the household’s income range, Table 1 shows that a household’s incentives over a 
fairly narrow range of income can fluctuate widely. This is especially problematic 
for earners with unpredictable work schedules and salaries that are not 
guaranteed.96 It is more difficult for low- to moderate-income earners to predict 
their annual incomes than it is for salaried employees with regular paychecks.97 
However, because most federal tax provisions, including those conferring 
benefits, are calculated on an annual basis, low- to moderate-income earners are 
more prone to engage in behavior that is not in their economic interests. 
 
Figure 2: After-Tax Economic Position of Taxpayer Versus Adjusted 
Gross Income (Combining Several Federal Tax Provisions) 
 
 
Figure 1 and the results shown in Table 1 did not show a taxpayer subjected 
to a cliff effect: each discontinuity in the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate involved 
a jump of less than 100%. Although the return obtained from earning 
additional income changes as the taxpayer in Figure 1 earns more income, the 
highest marginal tax rate endured by the taxpayer is 31%. As a result, the 
 
at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1025-28 (1993) (discussing the 
marginal tax rate of a second parent returning to the workforce). 
96 See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, Starbucks to Revise Policies to End Irregular Schedules for Its 130,000 
Baristas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at A11 (discussing Starbucks’s announced changes to scheduling 
policies based on employee complaints of unstable schedules and uncertain paycheck amounts). 
97 See Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
395, 413 (2003) (“[I]ncomes of disadvantaged families fluctuate far more than incomes of more 
advantaged families . . . .”). 
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
$45,000
$0 $10,000 $20,000 $30,000 $40,000
A
ft
er
-T
ax
 E
co
no
m
ic
 P
os
it
io
n
Adjusted Gross Income
952 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 931 
taxpayer’s after-tax economic position increases for every dollar earned. 
Figure 2 shows the post-tax economic position of the taxpayer whose marginal 
tax rate profile is illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1. 
However, for a taxpayer subjected to a cliff effect, an additional dollar of 
income could put the taxpayer in a worse post-tax economic position. As such, 
cliff effects exacerbate the difficulty of efficient financial planning caused by 
highly variable marginal tax rates by imposing marginal tax rates in excess of 
100%. Consider a married taxpayer with two children receiving the Earned 
Income Tax Credit.98 If her earned income is sufficient to earn the maximum 
Earned Income Tax Credit of $5572, her taxable income (other than 
investment income) is held constant at $19,000, and her investment income 
varies, then the Earned Income Tax Credit cliff effect creates a range of 
income past the $3400 cliff effect threshold over which the taxpayer is worse 
off. Figure 3 shows the after-tax economic position of such a taxpayer. 
 
Figure 3: After-Tax Economic Position of Taxpayer Versus  
Investment Income (Earned Income Tax Credit)99 
 
 
When the taxpayer in Figure 3 earns no investment income, her taxable 
income of $19,000 results in an Earned Income Tax Credit of $5572 and a 
 
98 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
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federal income tax liability of approximately $1900, resulting in a post-tax 
economic position of approximately $22,600.100 When investment income is 
$3401, however, the Earned Income Tax Credit amount drops to zero and 
taxable income is $22,401. The taxpayer’s post-tax economic position then is 
approximately $20,000. The range of income marked by the dotted line—
approximately $6500—is the amount of additional income (in the form of 
earned income, investment income, or other sources) the taxpayer must earn 
to be in the same economic position she was in prior to the imposition of the 
cliff effect.101 As this example shows, the difficulty in tax planning caused by 
a patchwork of various marginal tax rates is exacerbated by cliff effects.102 The 
more a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate profile involves large swings, the more 
burdensome financial planning becomes since the consequences of improper 
planning become increasingly severe—$1 of additional income could actually 
reduce post-tax earnings. For example, if the taxpayer is not acutely aware of 
payments potentially out of her direct control, such as dividend or interest 
payments, the result can be the loss of a $5572 Earned Income Tax Credit 
benefit. Because low- to moderate-income earners receive benefits from many 
of the tax provisions to which cliff effects are attached,103 the marginal tax rate 
profile for these earners is especially complicated. 
Empirical studies have confirmed that low- to moderate-income taxpayers 
are not as responsive to high marginal tax rates as their higher-earning 
counterparts.104 This lack of responsiveness can be explained by how 
complicated these taxpayers’ marginal tax rate profiles are.105 Although this 
 
100 In 2016, for a married taxpayer, a taxable income of $19,000 results in a tax liability equal to 
$1855 plus 15% of the taxable income in excess of $18,550. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
101 The income beyond the cliff effect ($3400 of investment income) is treated the same, as 
long as it is not exempt from federal income tax, no matter what type of income it is, since the cliff 
effect has triggered the loss of the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
102 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES ON LABOR 
INCOME (Nov. 2005) (detailing the various marginal tax rates applied to labor income that are 
imposed through multiple tax brackets, credits and deductions, and various taxpayer classifications). 
103 See supra Section I.A. 
104 See, e.g. Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and 
Implications, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 3 (2002) (finding that the elasticity of taxable income for those with 
incomes above $100,000 is less than one-third the elasticity for other income groups); Jennifer L. 
Romich et al., When Working Harder Does Not Pay: Low-Income Working Families, Tax Liabilities, and 
Benefit Reductions, 88 FAMILIES IN SOC’Y 418, 424 n.2 (2007) (citing both the complexity of marginal 
tax rates and the inability to reduce work hours as factors contributing to the inability to respond to 
high combined tax rates); Emmanuel Saez, Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points, 2 AM. ECON. J., Aug. 
2010, at 180, 181 (finding that “EITC recipients with only wage earnings display no evidence of 
bunching and thus the implied elasticity for wage earners is zero”). 
105 See Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling 9 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebman/schmeduling.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK8P-
7R4R] (“Even economists have a hard time computing effective marginal tax rates for welfare recipients.”). 
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does not create inefficiencies in the classic economic sense,106 the inability of 
low-income taxpayers to optimally respond to tax regimes with widely 
varying marginal tax rates imposes an unfair burden on these individuals.107 
As expressed by Learned Hand, any taxpayer “may so arrange his affairs that 
his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
which will best pay the Treasury.”108 However, the Internal Revenue Code’s 
system of widely varying marginal tax rates makes an optimal financial 
arrangement for low-income taxpayers essentially impossible. Cliff effects in 
the Internal Revenue Code exacerbate this problem. 
C. The Uniqueness of Income-Based Cliff Effects 
Cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code based on metrics other than 
income can be reconciled with notions of equity and efficiency. Cliff effects 
are sometimes associated with metrics such as the number of employees hired, 
hours worked by employees, value of qualifying distributions, percentage of 
corporate ownership, and income of a qualifying relative.109 The cliff effects 
not triggered by a taxpayer’s income are generally the result of a definitional 
need. For example, Congress has deemed it socially beneficial to subsidize the 
cost of education for students who have incurred certain educational 
expenses.110 This “Hope Scholarship Credit” is limited to students enrolled 
at least half-time for a portion of the year.111 An otherwise qualifying student 
could thus be precluded from receiving the tax credit by reducing her course 
load by one credit. Replacing this cliff effect with, say, some type of 
phaseout,112 would increase the provision’s complexity and undermine the 
definitional clarity of the term “student.” Still, the efficiency gains of the 
bright-line rule must be compared with the equity and efficiency costs of the 
benefit’s sudden elimination. The merits of how Congress has defined 
“student” here are debatable, but the inclusion of a cliff effect to effectuate 
that definition is not necessarily flawed: if Congress is attempting to 
incentivize certain behavior, such as paying for higher education, the 
 
106 See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 50-52 (3d ed. 2011) 
(explaining that social efficiency is maximized where supply equals demand and that deadweight 
loss occurs when trades are not being made where the benefits of the trade would be greater than 
the costs); see also infra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
107 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 85, at 2 (“If taxpayers misperceive their marginal 
tax rate . . . changes in their actual marginal tax rate may not have much effect on their decisions 
about how much to work.”) 
108 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
109 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
110 I.R.C. § 25A(b) (2012). 
111 Id. § 25A(b)(2)(B). 
112 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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increased complexity associated with eliminating the cliff effect would make 
the benefits of this behavioral change difficult to calculate. 
Unlike many nonincome-based cliff effects, cliff effects in the Internal 
Revenue Code based on a taxpayer’s income necessarily violate the principles 
of equity and efficiency. These tax provisions implicitly define taxpayers as 
members of either a lower-income and benefit-receiving group, or a higher-
income and nonbenefit-receiving group. In theory, this demarcation exists to 
accurately advance the goals of the tax provision by limiting the benefit 
recipients to a defined group based on income. But this categorization of 
taxpayers by pre-tax income directly conflicts with the rationale behind the 
tax provision, resulting in a flawed implementation of the provision. 
Separating taxpayers into low-income and benefit-receiving versus  
high-income and nonbenefit-receiving groups pre-tax should result in the 
low-income and benefit-receiving group being better off. But if a member of 
the group receiving benefits is in a better economic position than a member 
of the group not receiving benefits, the tax provision has undermined the 
objectives of properly classifying taxpayers. As a result of the cliff effect’s 
operation and the imposition of a marginal tax rate greater than 100%, 
taxpayers barely exceeding the income limit of the cliff effect will be in a 
worse economic situation than taxpayers falling just short of the cliff effect 
threshold. The use of cliff effects to classify taxpayers as eligible or ineligible 
by reason of income, therefore, is ineffective for some number of taxpayers 
just beyond the cliff effect.113 Cliff effects based on income are, therefore, 
always problematic to some degree on equity and efficiency grounds. 
D. Equity Concerns of Income-Based Cliff Effects 
Horizontal equity demands that tax provisions not treat similarly situated 
taxpayers differently.114 Because, tautologically, two identically situated 
 
113 A similar result occurs if the income-based cliff effect is intended as a proxy for some other 
hard-to-measure attribute, such as the taxpayer’s asset level. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying 
text. In this case, the cliff effect puts some taxpayers in the higher-asset and nonbenefit-receiving 
group in a worse post-tax situation than some taxpayers in the lower-asset and benefit-receiving 
group. This assumes that the hard-to-measure attribute for which the income is a proxy does not 
increase so dramatically relative to the cliff-triggering income that it compensates for the increase 
in tax liability. The validity of this assumption is illustrated by the limit on investment income 
required for Earned Income Tax Credit eligibility. Assuming a minimal return on assets of 1%, an 
additional dollar of investment income implies an additional $100 in assets, still nowhere near the 
$5572 of earned income credit lost. 
114 See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139, 
140 (1989) (“[M]ost commonly, [horizontal equity] is said to require the equal treatment of equals.”). 
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taxpayers cannot be treated differently,115 a tax provision’s compliance with 
horizontal equity requires defining what it means for taxpayers to be “similarly 
situated.” This is done by reference to some metric by which taxpayers can be 
compared. Most commonly, this metric is income. Consider two taxpayers who 
earn identical income but from different sources. Horizontal equity requires 
that the taxpayers have identical income tax liabilities, assuming no 
governmental interest exists in promoting one income source over another.116 
Vertical equity requires that, given two otherwise identical taxpayers, a taxpayer 
with more income should not pay less in taxes.117 
For cliff effects where the reference metric is something other than 
income, the line drawn might properly divide taxpayers into proper benefit-
receiving and nonbenefit-receiving groups. For example, a transportation 
subsidy for taxpayers younger than sixteen years old might be appropriate if 
these taxpayers are not permitted to obtain driving licenses before their 
sixteenth birthday. A sixteen-year-old taxpayer would experience a cliff effect 
on her sixteenth birthday but also become eligible for a driving license. 
Cliff effects based on income, however, necessarily violate tenets of both 
horizontal and vertical equity: two nearly identically situated taxpayers can, by 
virtue of slight differences in income, have significantly different tax liabilities. 
To satisfy horizontal equity, the differences between taxpayers subjected to the 
cliff effect and those not subjected to the cliff effect must render these 
taxpayers significantly dissimilar. Although cliff effects are used to means-test 
tax provisions conferring benefits, there is no meaningful distinction between 
taxpayers just next to either side of the income threshold of the cliff effect. 
Income-based cliff effects also contravene vertical equity. The proposition 
that a higher-earning taxpayer should pay no less in taxes than an otherwise 
identical but lower-earning taxpayer implies that a higher-earning taxpayer 
should not, by virtue of the Internal Revenue Code, be left in a worse economic 
position post-tax than the lower-earning taxpayer. If a taxpayer’s income qualifies 
 
115 See generally David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 43 (2006) (explaining that the principle of horizontal equity demands similar tax burdens for 
similarly situated individuals). 
116 Different income sources are often intentionally taxed differently. For example, long-term 
capital gains are taxed at a preferential rate. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012) (providing lower tax rates for long-term 
capital gains than for ordinary income); see also Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital 
Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477, 498, 515 (2009) (explaining that the reduced tax rates on capital gains are 
primarily based on the assumption that the proceeds from the reduced tax liability will be reinvested and 
arguing that these lower rates should only be available for capital gains that remain invested, as opposed 
to capital gains that are consumed). Some income sources, such as interest from state and local bonds, 
are entirely exempt from tax. I.R.C. § 103; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
117 See Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 64-65 (1988) (“Vertical equity . . . requires that there be an appropriate differential in tax burden 
between the different levels of economic income.”). This norm is silent on exactly how much more 
the taxpayer with a higher income should pay. 
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her for a tax benefit, her net economic position improves to some minimum 
standard. If an otherwise identical taxpayer with more income pre-tax is 
ineligible for the benefit by virtue of her additional income and is in a worse 
economic position post-tax than the lower-earning taxpayer, this minimum 
standard is not satisfied and, on a post-tax basis, vertical equity is violated. As 
demonstrated above, at the income threshold at which the cliff effect is triggered, 
taxpayers suffering a cliff effect are in a worse economic position relative to a 
lower-earning taxpayer whose income is just short of the cliff effect threshold. 
Although a given taxpayer subjected to the cliff effect might earn enough to 
compensate for the economic harm imposed by the cliff, there exists a range over 
which taxpayers are worse off for having earned the additional income. The costs, 
explicit and implicit, required to earn the additional income only exacerbate the 
consequences of income-based cliff effects.118 
For every violation of equity, whether horizontal or vertical, a theoretical 
minimum dollar amount exists that can be transferred to the suffering taxpayer 
to cure the equity violation. This “equity cost” represents the cost of modifying 
a tax provision that is structurally unsound on equity grounds to a provision 
that is not. The term “equity cost,” as used in this Article, is an aggregate 
microeconomic metric that represents the net economic loss suffered by all 
taxpayers who are in a worse economic situation post-tax than they would have 
been had they not exceeded the cliff effect threshold. If the cliff effect creating 
the equity cost is an income-based cliff effect attached to a means-tested tax 
provision, the equity cost represents a flaw in the implementation of the tax 
provision. If the tax provision is intended to benefit a group of taxpayers who 
are means-tested on a pre-tax basis by increasing their economic position, the 
tax provision should not make these beneficiaries better off than a group of 
taxpayers ineligible for the benefit by virtue of earning more. Either the 
subsidy provided by the tax provision is being awarded to taxpayers who do not 
need it, or the subsidy is not being provided to those taxpayers who do. 
In addition to benefitting some taxpayers with limited means, a tax provision 
with an equity cost is penalizing some taxpayers for earning more. Not every 
taxpayer with an income beyond the cliff effect threshold suffers an equity loss; 
at some level of income greater than the cliff effect threshold the economic loss 
of the equity cost of the cliff effect is outweighed by the additional income. This 
equity cost is borne by those taxpayers who, in retrospect, would have been better 
off economically had they earned less income. Thus, cliff effects may violate both 
horizontal and vertical equity by causing taxpayers who are nearly identical in 
economic status to have dramatically different tax burdens. 
 
118 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the explicit and often overlooked costs 
associated with employment). Implicit costs to working include the preference, if any, a taxpayer 
has for leisure over additional labor. 
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E. Efficiency Concerns of Income-Based Cliff Effects 
Measuring the efficiency of a given tax provision first requires determining 
the objective (or objectives) of the tax provision. An efficient tax provision will 
accomplish these objectives at a low cost. The primary objective of the tax on 
income, for example, is raising revenue.119 One measure of the cost of a tax 
provision is the extent to which the tax provision interferes with behavior that 
would have occurred in the absence of the provision.120 For example, if a 
taxpayer would work for no less than $12 per hour and is in a 40% marginal tax 
bracket, her pre-tax wage must equal twenty dollars per hour.121 Pre-tax, a wage 
of twelve dollars per hour is sufficient to incentivize the taxpayer to work. Post-
tax, a wage between twelve dollars and twenty dollars per hour will not be 
sufficient, representing the cost of the 40% marginal tax rate. Over this range 
of offered wages, the tax system has changed the taxpayer’s behavior and 
created inefficiencies by preventing behavior that both employee and employer 
find economically advantageous pre-tax.122 
For tax provisions that are not intended to change behavior, the classic 
measure of efficiency (or lack thereof) is the “deadweight loss,” or “excess 
burden” of the provision.123 The efficiency of these tax provisions is generally 
measured by examining the loss of surplus to both a consumer and producer 
when comparing pre- and post-tax behavior.124 This lost surplus rises with the 
square of the marginal tax rate.125 Cliff effects based on income, by definition, 
impose a marginal tax rate of greater than 100%. The deadweight loss 
associated with a tax provision with a cliff effect is greater than a tax provision 
that is phased out at some rate less than 100%.126 Put differently, any tax 
 
119 The first incarnation of the American income tax was borne from the need to finance the 
Civil War. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 70, at 5. In 2012 income taxes accounted for 
approximately 57% of all federal receipts. Id. at 15 fig.1.3. 
120 See George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, 
Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419, 464 (1993) (“[T]he efficiency costs of taxation increase 
with the degree of responsiveness of individual behavior to changes in taxes . . . .”). 
121 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
122 See Lily L. Batchelder et al., supra note 2, at 42 (“If markets were perfect, efficiency would 
imply interfering as little as possible in market outcomes. Because markets are imperfect, efficiency 
also entails eliminating market failures by minimizing transaction costs and correcting for 
externalities, market power, and information asymmetries.”). 
123 David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1627, 1650 (1999). 
124 See id. at 1650-51 (explaining that an efficient tax is one with a low deadweight loss, which 
is measured by the loss of value to consumers). 
125 Id. at 1656. 
126 See Christopher J. Conover, Congress Should Account for the Excess Burden of Taxation, POL’Y 
ANALYSIS, Oct. 13, 2010, at 4 (“[E]fficiency losses are much lower when a small tax increase is added 
across a wide tax base than if government raises the identical amount of tax revenue by increasing 
tax rates . . . .”) 
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provision not intended to change behavior that utilizes a cliff effect based on 
income to eliminate the benefit can be made more efficient by using a 
phaseout (at a rate less than 100%) instead of the cliff effect. 
Other tax expenditures are not solely intended to change behavior; rather, 
they are meant to also confer a benefit on some group of taxpayers in order 
to accomplish some socially valuable set of goals. For example, the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, in addition to incentivizing working, is also intended to 
bring people out of poverty.127 The child tax credit is also intended to help 
low-income households (with children) out of poverty but is not intended to 
incentivize households to have more children.128 However, regardless of the 
particular objective of the tax provision in question, efficiency is improved 
when the objective is achieved with a lower cost. 
Many tax expenditures, however, are intended to change behavior. For 
these provisions, if the behavior that the tax provision seeks to incentivize 
would occur in the absence of the subsidy provided by the tax provision, then 
the tax provision is inefficient—the federal government is essentially paying 
for something it is already getting for free.129 
F. Quantifying the Aggregate Cost of Income-Based Cliff Effects 
Several scholars have addressed issues confronted by low- and moderate-
income taxpayers subjected to varying marginal tax rates, including those 
associated with cliff effects based on a taxpayer’s income. These scholars 
typically focus on a small subset of taxpayers, such as those residing within a 
state or other clearly defined region for which there exists an available data 
set.130 Other studies use a single-family composition (i.e., a single parent with 
two children) and assess the consequences to the family as income 
 
127 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
128 149 CONG. REC. 86, H5328 (daily ed. June 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. Moore) (“[H]elping 
hard-working families make ends meet and raise their kids is the goal of the child tax credit.”). 
129 For instance, the low-income housing tax credit, which subsidizes the construction of low-
income housing, is often criticized on this ground. See, e.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH 
GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL 
AND AFFORDABLE 113 (2008) (citing studies finding “that a significant amount of LIHTC unit 
production is occurring in markets that would have built much of this housing in the absence of the 
subsidy program”). 
130 See, e.g., Holt & Romich, supra note 2 (documenting the extent and distribution of statutory 
and actual marginal tax rates for households in Wisconsin); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & David Rapson, 
Does It Pay, at the Margin, to Work and Save? Measuring Effective Marginal Taxes on Americans’ Labor Supply 
and Saving (concluding that the relationship between marginal tax rates and incentives to work and save 
is affected by numerous factors that make the relationship difficult to calculate and understand), in 21 
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 83, 84-86 (James M. Poterba ed., 2007); Elaine Maag et al., How 
Marginal Tax Rates Affect Families at Various Levels of Poverty, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 759, 764 (2012) (showing 
the variance among effective marginal tax rates across the United States and the potential effects these 
rates have on an individual’s incentive to work). 
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increases.131 These analyses are most important when the effects of direct 
transfer programs outside of the Internal Revenue Code are considered in 
conjunction with federal expenditures.132 The result of these efforts has been 
to calculate “effective” marginal tax rate profiles for narrow selections of 
taxpayers.133 For effective marginal tax rates that rise to the level of a cliff 
effect, the result is straightforward: taxpayers are incentivized to either earn 
enough income to overcome the loss created by the cliff effect or reduce their 
income to not be subjected to the cliff effect.134 This change in behavior, to 
the extent it occurs, represents an inefficiency generated by the imposition of 
the cliff effect: otherwise desirable behavior—i.e., an individual performing 
socially desirable work—is no longer being performed. 
However, low- to moderate-income taxpayers, as discussed previously, are 
not as responsive to high marginal tax rates as higher-earning taxpayers.135 To 
the extent that taxpayers do not or cannot reduce their income when confronted 
with an income-based cliff effect, the burden of the cliff effect becomes an 
equity violation rather than the inefficiency of a deadweight loss. Rather than 
imposing a deadweight loss on the universe, the cliff effect punishes a taxpayer 
by putting her in a worse economic situation by virtue of earning more. 
The marginal tax rate at the dollar triggering the cliff effect can be used 
to quantify the microeconomic cost of the cliff effect. This calculation is done 
relative to a taxpayer just prior to the cliff effect threshold and therefore not 
subject to the cliff effect. An exact accounting of the microeconomic effects 
of a cliff effect requires knowing the affected taxpayer’s elasticity in response 
to the cliff effect. In the absence of this level of detail, we can estimate the 
microeconomic equity cost by using the marginal tax rate imposed on the 
taxpayer for the dollar triggering the cliff effect. 
These microeconomic assessments of cliff effects do not, however, convey 
the magnitude of the cost of the cliff effect in the aggregate. For cliff effects 
in the Internal Revenue Code, this aggregate microeconomic cost is an 
empirical exercise that can only be calculated by estimating the number of 
taxpayers affected by the cliff effect in question and the extent to which each 
taxpayer is affected by the cliff effect. These variables are often affected by 
secondary variables such as family composition, income level, and geographic 
 
131 See, e.g., Maag et al., supra note 130, at 770-71 tbl.1 (showing the effective marginal tax rate 
of single parent with two children earning various amounts of income in various states). 
132 See infra notes 203–19 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
134 Many scholars have discussed taxpayers’ incentives to reduce work even in the absence of a 
cliff effect. See, e.g., LINDA GIANNARELLI & EUGENE STEUERLE, THE URBAN INST., THE 
TWICE-POVERTY TRAP: TAX RATES FACED BY AFDC RECIPIENTS 1 (Apr. 1995) (finding that the 
poverty trap—little or no reward for work—extends to twice the poverty level). 
135 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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location. Estimating this cost is necessary to assess whether any advantages 
from the cliff effect with respect to definitional clarity and simplicity outweigh 
any costs imposed on the taxpaying public from the behavioral changes induced 
and equity violations created. This aggregate microeconomic cost, heretofore 
omitted from the literature, is calculated for the cliff effects present in the 
health premium credit provisions of the Affordable Care Act in Part III. 
III. ASSESSING THE COSTS OF THE CLIFF EFFECTS ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The Affordable Care Act provides subsidies—in the form of tax credits—
for the premiums paid for certain health insurance plans purchased by 
individuals and families with incomes between 100% and 400% of the federal 
poverty level.136 These subsidies, called health premium credits, are intended 
to alleviate the financial burden of purchasing health insurance for low- to 
moderate-income earners.137 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated 
that the health insurance premium credits of the Affordable Care Act will result 
in foregone tax revenue of approximately $33 billion in 2015, increasing rapidly 
in future years to approximately $912 billion total between 2014 and 2024.138 
These premium credits are refundable and are based on federal poverty level 
as shown in Table 2. A taxpayer’s family composition affects her federal poverty 
level, which consequently affects the credit amount to which she is entitled. For 
example, a single-member household has a federal poverty level of $11,490, while 
a four-member household has a federal poverty level of $23,550.139 
 
 
136 I.R.C. § 36B (2012); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. The Affordable Care Act 
also established cost-sharing subsidies that limit the out-of-pocket costs (such as deductibles and co-
pays) for low-income individuals and families. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 1402(c), 124 Stat. 119, 221 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012)). These cost-sharing 
subsidies, though improving taxpayers’ net economic positions, do not (unlike the premium 
assistance credits) reduce taxpayers’ income tax liabilities. 
137 See Nicole Huberfield et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) (“The policy 
compromise was based on the idea that extremely low-income Americans should be provided public 
health insurance while slightly less impoverished individuals should be given federal tax credits to 
support private purchasing in the exchanges.”). 
138 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 
109 tbl.B-3 (Feb. 2014). 
139 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. These numbers apply only to taxpayers within the 
contiguous United States and the District of Columbia; the levels differ for taxpayers in  
Alaska and Hawaii. 
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Table 2: Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a  
Qualified Health Plan140 
 
Modified Household Income 
(as Percentage of Federal 
Poverty Level)
Initial Premium 
Percentage 
Final Premium 
Percentage 
100% to 133% 2.0% 2.0% 
133 to 150 3.0 4.0
150 to 200 4.0 6.3
200 to 250 6.3 8.05 
250 to 300 8.05 9.5
300 to 400 9.5 9.5
 
Taxpayers with modified adjusted gross incomes greater than 133% but 
less than 150% of federal poverty level must contribute three% of their total 
modified adjusted income (including income less than 133% of federal poverty 
level) towards their health insurance premiums. Transitioning from less than 
to more than 133% of the federal poverty level thus triggers a 1% loss in the 
credit to which the taxpayer is otherwise entitled.141 A second cliff effect also 
 
140 I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). The “premium percentage” is the percentage of the taxpayer’s 
modified adjusted gross income that is subtracted from the cost of the benchmark health plan to 
determine the maximum amount of the health premium credit. See infra note 157 and accompanying 
text. For household income ranges where the initial and final percentages differ, the applicable 
percentage is determined by interpolating between the initial and final credit percentages for the 
household income in question. For example, a household income equal to 275% of federal poverty 
level corresponds to an applicable percentage of 8.755% (halfway between 8.05% and 9.5%). I.R.C. 
§ 36B(b)(3)(A). “Household income” is defined as the sum of (1) the modified adjusted gross income 
of the taxpayer, plus 
(2) the aggregate modified adjusted gross incomes of all other individuals who (a) were 
taken into account in determining the taxpayer’s family size and (b) were required to file a 
return of tax for the taxable year. Id. § 36B(d)(2)(A). “Modified adjusted gross income” is 
defined as adjusted gross income plus any amount excluded from income by virtue of 
section 911, any tax-exempt interest, and the portion of social security benefits not included 
in gross income under section 86. Id. § 36B(d)(2)(B). 
141 For states that have opted into the expanded Medicaid coverage allowed for by the 
Affordable Care Act, eligibility for Medicaid is available for individuals earning less than 138% of 
the federal poverty level. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 2001(a)(1), §2002(a); see 
also Medicaid Expansion & What It Means for You, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.
gov/medicaid-chip/medicaid-expansion-and-you [https://perma.cc/6SK2-LXGC] (last visited Jan 
23, 2016) (“In states that have expanded Medicaid coverage: You can qualify based on your income 
alone. If your household income is below 133% of the federal poverty level, you qualify. (Because of 
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exists when a taxpayer earns more than 400% of the federal poverty level. Just 
prior to this point the taxpayer must contribute 9.5% of her income towards 
the cost of premiums; for incomes greater than 400% of federal poverty  
level, the subsidy vanishes. 
Using the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income, a distribution of 
the number of taxpayers in a given range of modified adjusted gross incomes 
can be determined. Assuming that taxpayers obtaining qualified health plans 
follow the same distribution, the number of taxpayers within a given range of 
modified adjusted gross income can be estimated.142 The cliff effect triggered at 
133% of federal poverty level is not a fixed number for all taxpayers since federal 
poverty level is dependent on the number of members in a family unit. A hybrid 
federal poverty level based on the United States’ average household size of 2.58 
can be used to estimate the number of enrolled taxpayers within a given adjusted 
income range.143 From this we can calculate the number of enrolled taxpayers 
who are in a worse position post-tax due to the cliff effect, and the cost of 
equalizing these taxpayers with taxpayers not subject to the cliff effect.144 This 
cost of equalization represents the equity cost of the cliff effect, or the total 
dollar amount by which the taxpayers just exceeding the cliff effect threshold 
are worse off than taxpayers just at—but not exceeding—the threshold. 
A taxpayer must earn approximately 1.5% of the federal poverty level 
beyond the cliff-triggering income (133% of the federal poverty level) to 
 
the way this is calculated, it turns out to be 138% of the federal poverty level. A few states use a 
different income limit.)”). As of January 2016, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted expanded coverage. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-
under-the-affordable-care-act [https://perma.cc/A46S-RCA8] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
142 See All Returns: Sources of Income, Adjustments, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax 
Year 2012, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12in14ar.xls [https://
perma.cc/X4RM-GLPQ] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) (listing sources of income, adjustments, and tax items 
by size of adjusted gross income for all returns). Within each given income range a linear distribution of 
returns was assumed. This distribution was assumed equivalent to the distribution (by adjusted gross 
income) of enrollees in qualified health plans. For purposes of this calculation, modified adjusted gross 
income was assumed to be equal to adjusted gross income and modified household income. 
143 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILIES: 2010, at 1 (Apr. 2012). For a family 
of two and a family of three the federal poverty level is $15,510 and $19,530, respectively, in the 
contiguous United States and District of Columbia. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 
78 Fed. Reg. 5182, 5183 (Jan. 24, 2013). The hybrid poverty level for the average U.S. household, 
based on the 2.58 average household size, is equal to the weighted average, or $17,842. One-hundred-
thirty-three percent of this hybrid poverty level is equal to $23,729. 
144 At 133% of federal poverty level a taxpayer must contribute 2% of her modified adjusted gross 
income toward the health insurance premium; between 133% and 150% of federal poverty level a 
taxpayer must contribute between 3 and 4%. See supra Table 2. The modified adjusted gross income, in 
terms of federal poverty level, at which the credit loss is compensated by additional income is found by 
solving for x in the following equation: (0.98)(1.33*FPL) = (x)(FPL) – ((x-1.33)/0.17 + 0.03)(x)(FPL). 
Solving for x, x is equal to 1.345. This calculation omits any additional credits for which the taxpayer 
might be eligible due to their increased income, i.e., the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
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counteract the 1% drop in premium credits.145 This translates to 
approximately $356 that a taxpayer must earn, on average, to undo the effect 
of the cliff effect.146 For taxpayers in this income range this is equal to, on 
average, approximately thirty additional hours of work.147 Over this income 
range there are approximately 35,000 people who are worse off post-tax 
relative to taxpayers they were better off than pre-tax.148 For 2014, these 
35,000 taxpayers were, in the aggregate, approximately $4 million worse off 
than they would have been had they earned less.149 This figure represents the 
minimum amount needed to be transferred to taxpayers just beyond the cliff 
effect threshold to ensure an economic position equal to taxpayers just before 
the cliff effect threshold.150 The Congressional Budget Office expects 
enrollment in marketplace health plans to increase dramatically in the next 
ten years.151 If the distribution of enrolled taxpayers by income stays constant 
as more taxpayers enroll in qualifying health plans, the aggregate equity cost 
from 2014 to 2024 will equal $286 million.152 
The preceding equity cost calculation for the cliff effect imposed at the 
133% federal poverty threshold assumes that every affected taxpayer receives 
the premium health credits for modified adjusted gross incomes between 100 
and 133% of the federal poverty level. However, this underestimates the cliff 
 
145 This is greater than the 1% lost due to the cliff because the amount of the subsidy decreases 
as income increases. See supra Table 2. 
146 One-and-a-half percent of the hybrid federal poverty level is equal to (1.5%)*($23,729) = $356. 
147 At 133% of the hybrid federal poverty level of $23,729, hourly wage is equal to approximately 
$11.90/hour. This conservatively assumes that the income is earned by a sole earner. The actual hourly 
wage is less, since the calculated hourly wage is for a household size of 2.58. 
148 There are approximately 65 million taxpayers between 100% and 400% of the hybrid federal 
poverty level (an income range that captures nearly all of the enrollees for the tax credit). INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., supra note 142. Approximately 1.1% of this group, or about 700,000 taxpayers, earns 
between 133% and 134.5% of the hybrid federal poverty level. 8 million enrollees correspond to roughly 
3.2 million enrolled taxpayers, assuming an average family size of 2.5 members. 1.1% of these 3.2 million 
enrolled taxpayers equals approximately 35,000. 
149 Post-cliff effect, 35,000 taxpayers lost, on average, $238 per year, because the cliff reduces 
the credit amount by 1% of adjusted gross income. Using a hybrid federal poverty level, the cliff-
triggering income is $23,729. Since the affected group is worst off at exactly the cliff effect threshold, 
and at parity with pre-cliff taxpayers at 134.5% of federal poverty level, we can approximate the lost 
credit assuming linearity. The affected group is then, in total, worse off by (35,000 taxpayers) times 
($238 per taxpayer) divided by 2, or approximately $4 million. 
150 The equity cost also approximates the additional amount of income required to be earned 
to place the taxpayers in the same economic position as the taxpayers just before the imposition of 
the cliff effect. This assumes that this subsequent income is earned tax-free. 
151 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 138, at 109 tbl.B-3. 
152 Id. The estimated total cost of the premium credits from 2014 to 2024 is $912 billion. ($912 
billion ÷ $13 billion)*($4 million) = $286 million. The reported current enrollment of 8 million 
enrollees (approximately 3.2 million taxpayers) and average credit per taxpayer ($3168 per year) for 
a total 2014 credit outlay of $10 billion is roughly equal to the Congressional Budget Office’s 2014 
cost estimate of $13 billion. 
2016] Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects 965 
effect since roughly half of all states have opted into expanded Medicaid 
coverage, which provides insurance, at a minimum, to taxpayers with 
modified gross incomes of 138% of the federal poverty level.153 Because the 
expanded Medicaid coverage will insure taxpayers earning less than 138% of the 
federal poverty level, approximately half of taxpayers affected by this cliff effect 
will in fact face a cliff effect of not 1% but 3% of modified adjusted income. This 
increases the total equity cost of this cliff effect to $8 million for 2014, with an 
aggregate cost until 2024 of $572 million.154 As more states opt into expanded 
Medicaid coverage, the equity cost of this cliff effect will continue to grow. 
The equity cost of the cliff effect occurring at 133% of federal poverty level 
is independent of the actual cost of the health insurance plan selected and the 
total amount of credit awarded. For taxpayers on either side of this cliff effect, 
the credit amount depends on a taxpayer’s income relative to the federal 
poverty level and the cost of a benchmark plan, not the specific plan 
selected.155 In contrast, to properly estimate the equity cost of the cliff effect 
occurring at 400% of the federal poverty level, which eliminates the credit 
entirely, the total value of the credit must be calculated. The value of the 
credit depends on the cost of the available health plans, which is in turn a 
function of the size of the taxpayer’s family, ages of the taxpayer’s family 
members, and the taxpayer’s residence.156 The credit is calculated as the 
difference between the exclusion amount and the benchmark plan.157 
A complete distribution of benchmark plan premiums across geographic 
locations for varying compositions of a taxpayer’s family would permit 
calculation of the premium credit that is lost at 400% of the federal poverty 
level. For some jurisdictions and family compositions, there is no cliff effect. 
For a twenty-seven-year-old in St. Louis earning $25,000, for example, the 
cost of the benchmark plan is $216 per month.158 At 400% of the federal poverty 
level, the taxpayer’s exclusion amount is $364, meaning the premium credit is 
 
153 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
154 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 138, at 109 tbl.B-3. If half of all taxpayers affected by 
the cliff effect suffer a cliff effect that is three times worse, the total cost is doubled. 
155 I.R.C. § 36B(b) (2012). See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
156 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: HEALTH INSURANCE 
MARKETPLACE PREMIUMS FOR 2014, at 7-8 tbl.1 (Sep. 25, 2013) (providing premium amounts 
based on a taxpayer’s age, family size, and residence). “Family,” as used here, refers to the members 
of the taxpayer’s tax-filing unit. 
157 The benchmark plan is the second-lowest cost silver plan offered by the relevant state or 
federal marketplace. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(B). Plans with the silver classification are required to pay 
an actuarial value of 70% to the aggregate group of silver plan members. Health Plan Categories, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/health-plan-categories [https://perma.
cc/8R7M-KS4Z] (last visited Jan.23, 2016). The exclusion amount is the applicable percentage times 
modified adjusted gross income. Id. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i). 
158 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 156, at 12 tbl.3. 
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eliminated for this taxpayer prior to the imposition of the cliff effect.159 For a 
family of four in Indianapolis with an income of $50,000, however, the cost of 
the benchmark plan is $1011 per month.160 For this family, the cliff effect at 
400% of federal poverty level results in the loss of a $3180 yearly subsidy.161 
The aggregate equity cost of this cliff effect cannot be calculated using a 
weighted average of national benchmark premium costs because not all 
taxpayers are subjected to a cliff effect. If the costs of these plans were 
averaged and considered in aggregate, the cliff effect for taxpayers with 
different family compositions or locations would be masked. Precisely 
calculating the equity cost requires data on each taxpayer’s family 
composition, size of family, and residence. In the absence of this precise data 
set, we can approximate the number of taxpayers subjected to the cliff using 
a combination of Internal Revenue Service and census data, and the fact that, 
by law, the price of the benchmark silver plan is not permitted to vary by 
more than a factor of three to one over all age ranges.162 
A taxpayer with a family of four at 400% of federal poverty level faces a 
premium credit loss worth approximately $1377 on average.163 The average 
taxpayer subjected to this cliff effect must work an additional twenty-nine 
 
159 The applicable federal poverty level for an individual is $11,490. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. Nine-and-a-half percent of four times $11,490 divided by 12 equals $364 per month. 
160 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 156, at 12 tbl.3. 
161 The applicable federal poverty level for an individual is $23,550. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. Nine-and-a-half percent of four times $23,550 divided by 12 equals $746 per 
month. The credit for this taxpayer is worth $265 ($1011 minus $746) monthly. 
162 See BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41137, HEALTH INSURANCE 
PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 11 (Mar. 
12, 2014) (“[F]or any given . . . plan in a geographic area, premiums may vary for adults between 21 and 
64+ years of age by a 3:1 ration.”). For the thirty-six non-State Based Marketplaces, data on the cost of 
the benchmark silver plan for a twenty-seven year-old was collected by the federal government. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 156, at 7-12. Estimates of the cost for other age ranges 
(twenty-eight to thirty-four, thirty-five to forty-four, forty-five to fifty-four, and fifty-five to sixty-five) 
were linearly interpolated using a maximum plan cost of three times the twenty-seven year-old cost. 
The cliff effect, where applicable, was calculated for all age ranges for all available states. The aggregate 
average cliff effect was determined using a weighted average based on each state’s population. Each 
enrollee was assumed to be an individual taxpayer, which results in a conservative estimate of equity 
cost since the federal poverty level per person is greater for an individual than for families. Annual 
Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182, 5183 (Jan. 24, 2013). 
163 The number of enrollees subjected to the cliff effect is estimated using IRS data on returns 
for taxpayers filing as one person. All Returns: Number of Returns, by Age, Marital Status, and Size of 
Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2012, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/12in16ag.xls [https://perma.cc/Q8YC-AHEU] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). The number of enrollees 
in the range between 400% of federal poverty level to 400% of federal poverty level plus $1377 was 
estimated using the percentage of taxpayers filing as one person within the same income range (2.2%). 
The total number of enrollees is 8,019,763. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE 
BRIEF: HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE: SUMMARY ENROLLMENT REPORT FOR THE INITIAL 
ANNUAL OPEN ENROLLMENT PERIOD 5 tbl.2 (May 1, 2014). The aggregate microeconomic cliff effect 
is then equal to ($1377)*(2.2%)*(8,019,763)/2 = $121,475,350. 
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hours to compensate for the economic loss imposed by the cliff effect.164 This 
estimate of additional hours worked conservatively assumes the taxpayer’s 
additional labor is not subjected to federal or state income taxes. 
Not all age groups are equally subjected to the cliff effect. The benchmark 
silver plan tends to cost less than the applicable exclusion amount for enrollees 
younger than thirty-four years old but more than the exclusion amount for 
enrollees between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-four. The latter group 
comprises roughly 65% of all current enrollees, meaning that the more expensive 
health plans are selected more frequently than the lower-cost plans available to 
younger enrollees.165 Taxpayers between fifty-five and sixty-five years of age, on 
average, face a cliff effect worth approximately $3315 (or 144 hours of labor) when 
their income eclipses 400% of the federal poverty level.166 
Approximately 176,000 taxpayers are ineligible for the health premium 
credit due to the cliff effect occurring at 400% of the federal poverty level.167 
The income that puts them more than 400% from the federal poverty level—
thus precluding these taxpayers from receiving the subsidy—does not make 
them whole relative to the value of the tax credit lost. The aggregate equity 
cost of this cliff effect is approximately $121 million, or nearly 1% of the 
estimated cost of the entire subsidy.168 From 2014 to 2024, this represents a 
total equity cost of approximately $8.5 billion.169 Although low- to moderate-
 
164 Assuming 2000 hours worked in a year and an income of 400% of federal poverty level—
$94,200—results in an hourly wage of $47.10, then $1377 divided by $47.10 per hour equals 29.2 hours. 
165 Id. at 18 app. tbl.A1. 
166 The average cliff effect for taxpayers between (1) zero and twenty-seven years old, (2) 
twenty-seven and thirty-four, (3) thirty-five and forty-four, (4) forty-five and fifty-four, and (5) fifty-
five and sixty-four is zero, $12, $603, $1930, and $3315, respectively. 
167 See supra note 163. The number of affected taxpayers is equal to 2.2% times 8,019,763, or 176,435. 
168 See supra notes 152 and 163 and accompanying text. 
169 The premium credit is estimated to cost approximately $912 billion from 2014 until 2024. Thus, 
$121 million divided by $13 billion multiplied by $912 billion equals approximately $8.5 billion. See supra 
note 152 and accompanying text. The calculation of aggregate microeconomic equity costs for the two 
cliff effects associated with the Affordable Care Act assumed that the distribution of taxpayers by 
income does not change as a result of the imposition of the cliff effect. The Affordable Care Act 
provides subsidies to taxpayers earning 400% or less of the federal poverty level. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. These taxpayers are not well-situated to reduce their income to avoid the penalty 
of the cliff effect. See Katie Thomas et al., New Health Law Frustrates Many in Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2013, at A1 (highlighting, inter alia, the plight of some middle class individuals whose income 
fluctuation puts them on different sides of the cliff from year to year); see also supra notes 96–97 and 
accompanying text. Low- to moderate-income earners must allocate a larger share of their income to 
necessities and have a smaller percentage of their earnings as disposable income. Low- to moderate-
income earners also have work schedules that are less discretionary. See supra note 96 and accompanying 
text. As a result, these taxpayers do not exhibit strong behavioral responses to adverse tax consequences. 
See supra note 104 and accompanying text. If low- to moderate-income taxpayers were able to, contrary 
to empirical results, modify their behavior in response to the economic consequences imposed by the 
cliff effect, the calculated equity cost would indeed be lower. But with this reduction of equity cost 
would also come a deadweight loss created by the changed behavior. In other words, if taxpayers 
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income taxpayers are in a better economic position overall because of the 
premium credit, the significant equity cost represents a flaw in the credit’s 
implementation. The premium credit is intended to enable low- to moderate-
income taxpayers to affordably procure health insurance for themselves and 
their families.170 But the premium credit, at two levels of income eligibility, 
makes certain taxpayers worse off post-tax than these taxpayers would have 
been had they earned less income pre-tax. Such a result undermines the 
normative justifications for the premium credit’s existence. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
The preceding Part illustrates the hidden costs of the income-based cliff 
effects in the Affordable Care Act. Cliff effects can cause inequitable results 
for certain taxpayers and can also significantly undermine how effectively the 
tax provision in question accomplishes its objectives. Even a small cliff effect 
impacting a small number of taxpayers is unfair, while a large cliff effect 
affecting a large number of taxpayers is both unfair and can measurably 
undermine the goals of the provision. 
While the costs associated with a cliff effect can be removed by repealing the 
underlying provision to which the cliff effect is attached, doing so misses the 
point and is akin to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Assuming the tax 
provision to which the cliff effect is attached serves a valuable social goal, when 
should this cliff effect be removed, and with what should it be replaced? 
This Part establishes a methodology through which problematic cliff effects, 
both income-based and not, can be identified and replaced. This process requires 
first determining the goals of the tax provisions to which the cliff effect is 
attached and assessing if the costs of the cliff effect are worth the gains in 
simplicity. Problematic cliff effects can then be replaced with phaseouts either at 
or prior to the cliff effect threshold. Another potential solution involves ensuring 
that taxpayers are not made worse off post-tax for earning more pre-tax, 
eliminating the possibility that a taxpayer will suffer from a cliff effect. 
A. Identify Problematic Cliff Effects 
To assess the validity of a cliff effect, the goals of the tax provision to 
which the cliff effect is attached must be determined. The benefits provided 
by the cliff effect—most often in establishing bright-line rules or serving as 
proxies for other, hard-to-measure metrics171—should be compared to 
 
responded to the cliff effect by earning less income, the costs calculated as an equity cost would instead 
become classic deadweight loss inefficiencies. 
170 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra Section I.B. 
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alternative scenarios in which the cliff effect is replaced by a benefit-limiting 
substitute that does not impose a marginal tax rate greater than 100%. Of 
critical importance is determining the extent to which the cliff effect advances 
the stated goal of the tax provision and at what cost. 
1. Determine the Goals of the Tax Provision to Which  
the Cliff Effect Is Attached 
In order to determine whether a cliff effect is effectively implementing the 
tax provision to which it is attached, the goal of the tax provision must be 
accurately determined. This may not be clear from the text of the statute. For 
example, the Earned Income Tax Credit contains a cliff effect with respect to 
investment income only because investment income is assumed to correlate with 
asset level,172 and it is thus not readily apparent from the text of the statute why 
the cliff effect exists. Indeed, for many statutes the intent of Congress must be 
divined from the legislative history or other secondary sources. 
For other provisions, the legislative intent is clear and might contain stronger 
justifications for relying on a bright-line rule that creates a cliff effect. For 
example, § 45P provides a wage credit for “small business employer[s]” who hire 
active duty members of the uniformed services,173 revealing the congressional 
intent to incentivize small businesses to hire military reservists.174 As such, the 
credit is limited to businesses with less than fifty employees.175 This creates a cliff 
effect: the credit is available in full to employers with fifty employees but not to 
employers with fifty-one. The statute could instead use a sliding scale wherein 
the credit amount is adjusted depending on the number of employees. Such a 
modification could potentially prevent previously qualifying small businesses 
from taking advantage of the credit due to the increased complexity. Additionally, 
the statute contains other cliff effects not based on income, such as a requirement 
that the eligible employee be employed for a certain ninety-one day period.176 
Converting multiple cliff effects into a sliding scale or phaseout would 
significantly increase complexity and frustrate the intent of the statute. The 
simplicity of the cliff effect could, depending on the statute,  
more effectively promote the statute’s goals. 
 
172 See supra note 20–27 and accompanying text. 
173 I.R.C. § 45P(a) (2012). 
174 See S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 36 (2012) (“The Committee believes that it is still appropriate 
to encourage small employers to make differential wage payments to employees during any period 
that the employee is called to duty for a period of more than 30 days in the uniform services.”). 
175 I.R.C. § 45P(b)(3)(A)(i). 
176 See id. § 45P(b)(2) (“The term ‘qualified employee’ means a person who has been an 
employee of the taxpayer for the 91-day period immediately preceding the period for which any 
differential wage payment is made.”). 
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For tax provisions where the intent is clear, an associated cliff effect is 
most effective when the provision both intends to change the behavior of the 
taxpayer and this behavior is elastic with respect to the metric to which the 
cliff effect is attached. Consider, for example, a sales tax exemption that 
applies to all drinks with a sugar concentration less than one gram per ounce. 
If the intent of the provision is to induce taxpayers to consume drinks with 
lower sugar contents, the cliff effect with respect to sugar content could be 
effective because the provision intends to change taxpayer behavior and 
taxpayer behavior may be extremely responsive to this additional cost. 
This example of a cliff effect where taxpayers are extremely responsive to 
the additional cost imposed by the cliff effect can be contrasted with cliff effects 
that use income as the reference metric. Income-based cliff effects constitute a 
majority of the cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code.177 These provisions 
use a taxpayer’s income as the reference metric by which eligibility for a tax 
benefit is conferred. To the extent that the goal of these tax provisions is to 
confer a benefit on some identified group of lower-income taxpayers and raise 
them to some minimum standard, the cliff effect cannot be appropriate: 
behavior is not likely to be affected in the manner intended by the provision 
because taxpayers may be incentivized to bypass additional income instead of 
losing a tax benefit available only to those defined as low-income taxpayers. If, 
however, the income-based cliff effect is intended to change behavior and, in 
fact, does change behavior, the cliff effect could be effective. Although a cliff 
effect based on income creates a subset of taxpayers who are worse off because 
of it, the social gains from producing the desired behavioral changes could 
outweigh the aggregate equity costs the cliff effect imposes if the group bearing 
the equity cost is small. However, the inability of low- to moderate-income 
taxpayers to regulate their income implies that the majority of income-based 
cliffs, even if intended to change behavior, will result in a significant number 
of taxpayers bearing an equity cost.178 
Determining the goals of a tax provision to which a cliff effect is attached is 
not always a simple task. In addition, income-based cliff effects typically affect 
low- to moderate-income taxpayers who cannot easily change their behavior in 
response to the economic burden imposed by the cliff effect. As such, the costs 
imposed by income-based cliff effects make their use difficult to justify. 
2. Assess the Costs of the Cliff Effect 
After the goals of the tax provision have been identified, the costs of the 
cliff effect must be quantified. Implicit in this cost determination is that the 
 
177 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
178 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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tax provision under analysis is, prior to the cliff effect threshold, of positive 
social utility; the recipients of the benefit in question are ostensibly receiving 
the credit, deduction, or exclusion in question because the baseline system of 
taxation is not properly accounting for some positive social benefit flowing 
from the behavior incentivized by the benefit. When the tax provision 
involves a cliff effect based on income, the provision becomes an incentive for 
taxpayers to engage in certain behavior provided they satisfy an income 
restriction. The Earned Income Tax Credit, for example, incentivizes earning 
income by working (to a point).179 Similarly, the Affordable Care Act 
incentivizes low- to moderate-income taxpayers to purchase health 
insurance.180 Implicit in each tax provision is the assumption that certain 
behavior (for the Earned Income Tax Credit, working; for the Affordable 
Care Act, having health insurance) of low- to moderate-income taxpayers 
results in positive social utility. What should be determined, then, is the 
extent to which the costs of the cliff effect undermine these objectives. 
Both the individual and aggregate microeconomic cost calculations, as 
described in Part III, are important considerations. A cliff effect with a large 
individual microeconomic cost but a small aggregate microeconomic cost is 
indicative of a cliff effect that has a significant financial impact only on a small 
number of taxpayers. On the other hand, a cliff effect with a small 
microeconomic cost but a large aggregate microeconomic cost is indicative  
of a cliff effect that affects all taxpayers only to a small degree. These  
costs should then be weighed against the gains obtained from the  
clarity provided by the cliff effect.181 
If the clarity of the cliff effect encourages taxpayers to engage in desired 
behavior, the number of taxpayers bearing the equity cost will be small 
relative to those modifying their behavior in order to not cross the cliff effect 
threshold. If the tax provision generates positive social utility for those 
taxpayers qualifying for it, this change in behavior could result in a net 
positive social gain provided that the social benefit generated by the change 
is greater than any deadweight loss created by the changed behavior. 
There is no formula to precisely determine whether a cliff effect is “worth” 
the costs it imposes; each cliff effect must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
The cliff effects of the Affordable Care Act are illustrative. The cliff effect 
occurring at 133% of federal poverty level has a microeconomic cost of 
approximately $356 per affected taxpayer and an aggregate cost of 
 
179 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
181 Many of the simplifying assumptions made in this Article to calculate the aggregate 
microeconomic costs of cliff effects are obviated given the complete data that the Internal Revenue 
Service has at its disposal. Using data from actual returns would permit the Treasury to determine 
more precisely the current and future costs associated with cliff effects. 
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approximately $4 million.182 Although the aggregate cost is small relative to 
the total cost of the health premium credit subsidy—$33 billion in 2015183—
the cost per taxpayer is significant. This is especially meaningful given that 
the taxpayers affected by this cliff effect are only slightly above the federal 
poverty level, with this dollar amount equal to at least thirty hours of 
additional labor.184 For the cliff effect occurring at 400% of federal poverty 
level, the individual microeconomic and aggregate microeconomic costs of 
$1377 and $121 million, respectively, indicate a significant expense that will 
only increase in future years.185 The simplicity gains obtained from the cliff 
effects associated with the Affordable Care Act are not immediately obvious 
and, as such, their modification should be strongly considered. 
The costs imposed by utilizing a cliff effect should be determined prior to 
making the cliff effect permanent law. To the extent these costs undermine 
the ostensible social utility of the tax provision in question, the use of the cliff 
effect should be questioned. 
B. Replace Problematic Cliff Effects with Alternate Provisions 
Any cliff effect based on income imposing costs greater than any social utility 
it creates can be eliminated by phasing out the benefit over a span of income 
starting either before or at the cliff effect threshold rather than eliminating the 
benefit entirely. However, using a phaseout results in either a greater total cost 
of the benefit or a reduction in benefits to some recipients. If a subsidy’s phaseout 
begins at the same point at which the cliff effect occurs, there will be additional 
recipients of the subsidy, increasing the total cost of the subsidy. If a phaseout 
replaces a cliff effect and remains revenue-neutral, the phaseout must occur prior 
to the income threshold at which the cliff effect occurred. Although taxpayers 
will not be subjected to a cliff effect, some taxpayers will be worse off than they 
were with the cliff effect in place. Solely in dollar terms, replacing a cliff and its 
attendant effect with a phaseout can never be a Pareto improvement.186 
If the tax expenditure in question properly incentivizes behavior that is 
socially beneficial, all taxpayers prior to the cliff effect are engaging in behavior 
 
182 See supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text. In aggregate, the equity cost of the cliff 
effect happening at 400% of the federal poverty level from 2014 to 2024 is $8.5 billion. CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 138, at 109 tbl.B-3. 
186 A Pareto improvement is one in which at least one participant is better off and no 
participants are worse off. See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, 
and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 175 (2000) (“[T]he Pareto principle[] holds that if each 
individual prefers one state of affairs over another, then social welfare must be higher in the first 
state than in the other state.”). 
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generating positive social utility. For these cliff effects, a phaseout at the cliff 
effect threshold—but not before—is appropriate. If taxpayers prior to the cliff 
effect threshold are better off than some taxpayers subjected to the cliff effect, 
the taxpayers subjected to the cliff effect, post-tax, should be made no worse 
off than the taxpayers prior to the cliff effect. This requires a phaseout rate that 
reduces the subsidy by no greater than $1 for every additional dollar of income. 
By constraining the marginal tax rate during the phaseout to be no greater than 
100%, taxpayers will be no worse off for earning additional income. 
Some taxpayers receiving a tax benefit may not generate positive social 
utility by engaging in the subsidized behavior. Income-based cliff effects 
typically subsidize behavior for low- to moderate-income taxpayers. The 
implication is that the amount of positive social utility generated from the 
tax provision decreases as income increases. For these tax provisions, some 
portion of the subsidy is misallocated and the associated cliff effect can be 
replaced with a phaseout starting prior to the current cliff effect threshold.187 
If, for example, the distributional rationales of the health care premium 
credits for low-income taxpayers were not valid for higher-earning taxpayers 
still qualifying for the credit, the credit would be improperly allocated to 
these higher-earning taxpayers. Depending on both the point at which the 
phaseout begins and the phaseout rate, replacing an income-based cliff effect 
with a phaseout prior to the cliff effect threshold could result in no loss of 
social utility and be revenue neutral (or even result in cost savings). 
Phaseouts are already commonly used in the Internal Revenue Code. For 
example, § 179 provides for accelerated expensing of up to $25,000 of property 
purchased for use in a business.188 If more than $200,000 of such property is 
placed into service, however, the § 179 deduction is reduced dollar-for-dollar, 
or at a 100% rate.189 For tax provisions based on income, phaseout rates are 
similarly typically at rates less than 100%. The phaseout rates for the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, for example, vary from 7.65 to 21.06%.190 
 
187 Constraints limiting the revenue effects of any modifications could also cause a phaseout 
from a point prior to the cliff effect threshold. 
188 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 124(a)(1) (2015) (amending I.R.C. 
§ 179(b)(1)); see also GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, THE SECTION 179 AND 
BONUS DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW AND ISSUES FOR THE 114TH 
CONGRESS 3 tbl.1 (Aug. 6, 2015) (displaying maximum expensing allowance and limitations for § 179 
expenses from 1987 through 2015). 
189 I.R.C. § 179(b)(2). The limitiation begins at $200,000 in 2015. GUENTHER, supra  
note 188, at 3 tbl.1. 
190 See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A) (phasing out the Earned Income Tax Credit at 7.65, 15.98, and 
21.06% if the taxpayer has zero, one, or two qualifying children, respectively); see also id. § 25A(d)(2) 
(reducing Lifetime Learning Credit by no greater than twenty cents for each additional dollar of 
income); id. § 221(b)(2)(B) (reducing student loan deduction by no greater than 16.7 cents for each 
additional dollar of income). 
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A phaseout rate of less than 100% is appropriate for tax provisions based on 
income because there are costs of working that reduce a worker’s nominal wage, 
adjusting an individual’s incentives to work.191 These costs include explicit 
expenses such as transportation expenses, child care costs, and other implicit 
costs like foregone leisure and educational opportunities.192 A phaseout 
percentage of exactly 100% would still likely have an associated equity cost. A 
low- to moderate-income taxpayer who is unable to modify the amount of 
income earned would suffer a true marginal tax rate, once costs of working are 
included, of greater than 100%. Additionally, to the extent taxpayers do modify 
their behaviors in response to the increased marginal tax rate conferred by the 
phaseout percentage, the lower the phaseout percentage, the more efficient the 
phaseout becomes. For phaseout rates with marginal tax rates lower than 100%, 
a lower rate over a larger range of income is more efficient than a higher rate 
over a smaller range of income.193 If the phaseout occurs at the same threshold 
income, phasing out the benefit over a larger range of income creates a more 
expensive but more efficient provision.194 
The health premium credit in the Affordable Care Act already 
incorporates phaseouts by excluding an increasing percentage of modified 
adjusted gross income from the applicable credit.195 As a result, the cliff effect 
in the Affordable Care Act occurring at 133% of federal poverty level could be 
remedied by simply changing the initial premium percentage (shown in Table 
1) for the income range beginning at 133% from 3.0% to 2.0%.196 The 
additional revenue required to implement this change represents a miniscule 
fraction of the overall cost of the subsidy and ensures no sudden loss in credit 
for approximately 35,000 taxpayers.197 
Cliff effects based on income imposing costs greater than the social utility 
they create can be replaced with phaseouts imposing marginal tax rates of less 
than 100%. Where the phaseout should begin and end depends on the social 
 
191 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
192 See Maag et al., supra note 130, at 771 (discussing how child care costs and transportation 
costs hinder incentives to perform additional work). 
193 For marginal tax rates less than 100%, the deadweight loss is proportional to the square of 
the marginal tax rate. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
194 A phaseout utilizing a lower rate over a longer span of income need not be more expensive 
relative to higher-rate, shorter-income-span phaseout if the former begins at a threshold income 
earlier than the latter. 
195 See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
196 The Affordable Care Act’s peculiar path to enactment prevented certain modifications to 
be made to the original version of the bill. See John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable 
Care Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 159-69 (2013) 
(describing the Affordable Care Act’s passage via the reconciliation process). 
197 The cost to eliminate this cliff effect is approximately $4 million out of a total cost of 
approximately $10 billion. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
2016] Hidden Costs of Cliff Effects 975 
utility of the tax provision in question at the cliff effect threshold, and on 
whether or not the modification should be revenue neutral. 
C. Ensure Taxpayers Are Not Worse Off Post-Tax  
for Any Increase in Pre-Tax Income 
Of course, any solution to mitigate the harsh consequences of cliff effects 
must not harm taxpayers any more than the cliff effect it is replacing. Cliff 
effects based on income result in some group of taxpayers being in a worse 
economic position simply by virtue of earning more income. Taxpayers can 
be protected from suffering this equity cost by the Internal Revenue Code 
awarding each affected taxpayer a credit to bring her post-tax economic 
position to the maximum level it would have been had she earned less income. 
For example, consider a taxpayer who loses a $1000 tax benefit once her 
income reaches $20,000. If this taxpayer’s income is $20,400 and the income 
beyond $20,000 is taxed at 25%, she is economically worse off by $700 by 
earning the extra $400 beyond the $20,000 cliff effect.198 A $700 credit would 
compensate the taxpayer for the burden of the cliff effect. Even if the taxpayer 
has deductions allocated to the extra earnings that are factored into the credit 
award, the severity of the cliff effect would be greatly diminished.199 
Another way to ensure taxpayers are not economically worse off post-tax 
from earning additional income is to ensure that taxpayers will not endure 
marginal tax rates greater than some fixed percentage. Even if every cliff effect 
were converted into a phaseout, taxpayers may still experience high marginal 
tax rates for income earned beyond the eliminated cliff effect. As previously 
discussed, a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate profile is not static.200 Depending on 
factors such as family composition and eligibility for other tax benefits, the 
phaseout range for one tax expenditure could overlap with the phaseout range 
of another. This can result in a marginal tax rate greater than 100% even though 
the phaseout percentages of each individual tax provision are less than 100%. A 
solution to this issue is to limit the maximum marginal tax rate that a taxpayer 
must face. The phaseout rates for various provisions would, in effect, not be 
constant but would vary according to an individual’s particular marginal tax rate 
profile. If, for example, this maximum marginal tax rate were 40%, a taxpayer 
would be assured that any additional income earned would increase her net 
economic position by at least 60% of the additional income earned. 
 
198 $400 in extra income minus $100 in tax owed on this $400 minus the $1000 tax benefit  
equals negative $700. 
199 In this example, if the taxpayer’s extra $400 is allocated to an expense for which a deduction 
was taken, her credit would be reduced by $100 to $600. 
200 See supra note 81–87 and accompanying text. 
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The computational burden associated with both approaches to eliminating 
equity cost is not prohibitive. Although this approach has a degree of 
computational complexity that most low- to moderate-income taxpayers do 
not typically encounter, nearly 90% of tax returns are now prepared using 
computers.201 Even in the absence of dynamic phaseout rates, most low- to 
moderate-income taxpayers’ effective marginal tax rate profiles are incredibly 
complicated to understand.202 Implementing a maximum marginal tax rate 
and dynamic phaseout rates necessarily complicate the marginal tax profile 
for a taxpayer, but for a worthwhile gain. It would be difficult for a taxpayer 
to know precisely how any given dollar of income would be treated; however, 
the opacity of a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate profile could easily be worth the 
added security of guaranteeing that the taxpayer will not suffer a significant 
financial loss due to an incremental increase in income. 
V. CLIFF EFFECTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH STATE AND LOCAL TAX 
REGIMES AND DIRECT TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
The preceding discussion does not discuss tax laws and direct transfer 
programs effected outside of the Internal Revenue Code. Cliff effects occur 
frequently in both tax provisions at the state and local level,203 and in locally 
 
201 See Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 91, 
95 (2010) (noting that 89% of individuals’ tax returns were prepared on computers in 2006). 
202 See Kotlikoff & Rapson, supra note 130, at 86 (“[I]t’s essentially impossible for anyone to 
understand her incentive to work, save, or contribute to retirement accounts absent highly advanced 
computer technology and software.”). 
203 For example, the New York State sales tax on clothing and footwear exempts items sold for 
less than $110 per item; a $109 pair of shoes is not subject to sales tax, while a $110 pair of shoes would 
be subject to a sales tax on the full amount. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FIN., PUB. 718-
C: SALES AND USE TAX RATES ON CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 1 (Aug. 2015). 
The New York State Estate Tax only applies to estates exceeding the Basic Exclusion Amount 
(BEA). N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FIN., TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM TSB-M-
14(6)M: NEW YORK STATE ESTATE TAX REFORMED 3 (Aug. 25, 2014). Below this amount, estates 
are not subject to any estate tax; between 100% and 105% of the BEA, estates are subject to the estate 
tax but entitled to a credit; above 105% BEA, the estate is subject to the full estate tax. Id. For estates 
subject to the estate tax, the tax applies to the entire value of the estate, not just the portion above 
the BEA. Id. at 2. 
Several of Connecticut’s tax credits include nonincome-related cliff effects. First, the Financial 
Institutions Tax Credit allows a financial institution to take 50% of its corporation business tax as a 
credit if it has 2000 or more employees, but only 40% if it has 1999 employees. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-
217u(c) (2015). Next, the Qualified Small Business Job Creation Tax Credit defines small businesses 
entitled to the credit as those employing less than fifty employees, creating a cliff with reference to the 
number of employees. Id. § 12-217nn(3). Third, the Connecticut Earned Income Tax Credit tracks its 
federal counterpart, resulting in the same cliff effect regarding investment income. Id. § 12-704e(e). 
New York’s Earned Income Credit also follows the same guidelines as the federal version, but the credit 
amount is 30% of the federal EIC amount. N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(d) (McKinney 2015). Finally, the 
Hiring Incentive Tax Credit for hiring recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families only 
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run direct transfer programs.204 Although these benefits do not generally affect 
an individual’s federal income tax liability, they affect a claimant’s net economic 
 
applied to those employees who work at least thirty hours a week—at twenty-nine hours, the employer 
was entitled to no credit. CONN. GEN. STAT. §12-217y (repealed 2013). 
New York has a household credit against city personal income tax paid that contains a cliff effect. The 
credit is $15 for a single individual with household income at or below $10,000, $10 for an individual with 
household income between $10,000 and $12,500, and $0 if income is above $12,500. N.Y. TAX LAW 
§ 1310(d)(2)(A). This creates a cliff effect at $10,000 and $12,500 of income. 
New York also has a refundable state school tax reduction credit. Taxpayers with income of more than 
$250,000 in 2010 (adjusted for inflation each year after 2010) are not entitled to any credit. Id. § 1310(e)(2). 
New York’s Empire State child credit, eligibility for which is based in part on the federal child 
tax credit, is only available to taxpayers whose adjusted gross income is $110,000 or less, for joint 
returns. See id. § 606(c-1)(1) (limiting eligibility for New York’s child credit to those eligible for the 
federal child tax credit); see also I.R.C. § 24(b)(2) (2012) (limiting eligibility for the federal child tax 
credit for joint filers to incomes under $110,000). 
The New York Family tax relief credit of $350 is sent by the State’s Tax Department to taxpayers 
who, among other qualifications, had adjusted gross income between $40,000 and $300,000. N.Y. 
TAX LAW § 606(vv)(2). 
New York’s property tax freeze credit, which reimburses qualifying homeowners for increases 
in local property taxes, is only available to households with a total income of $500,000 or less. N.Y. 
TAX LAW § 606(bbb)(2); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 425(b-1) (McKinney 2015). 
204 Most states determine TANF eligibility using a percentage of the federal poverty level or 
some other income standard, which results in a cliff effect; if one more dollar is earned above this 
limit, all TANF benefits are lost. ERIKA HUBER ET AL., OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH, AND 
EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OPRE REPORT 2015-81, WELFARE 
RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2014, at 33-34, 82-83 tbl.I.E.1 (Aug. 2015). 
The federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), which is administered 
jointly by the federal and state governments, generally limits eligibility to those at or below 130% of 
the federal poverty level. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(a)(1) (2015). When a household’s income goes $1 above 
the income limit, that household loses all of its SNAP benefits. 
States are given some flexibility to set income standards for the Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC) program. The guidelines prescribed by the state, however, may not exceed the guidelines for 
reduced-price school meals and cannot be less than 100% of the federal poverty level. Id. 
§ 246.7(d)(1). For example, in Connecticut, WIC is limited to households at or below 185% of federal 
poverty level. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19a-59c-2(b) (2015). 
Connecticut Child Care Assistance is limited to families whose income is below 50% of the 
“state median income” level. Id. § 17b-749-05(a)91. 
Connecticut homebuyer and housing assistance programs are rife with cliff effects. Eligibility for 
many of these programs is tied to regional income guidelines promulgated by the Connecticut Housing 
Finance Authority (“CHFA”). These programs include: the 203(k) and 203(k) Streamline 
Rehabilitation Mortgage Loan Program, the HFA Preferred Loan Program, the Homebuyer Mortgage 
Program; the Mobile Manufactured Home Loan Program, the Police Homeownership Program, the 
Teachers Mortgage Assistance Program, and the Veterans Homeownership Pilot Program. See Home, 
CONN. HOUSING FIN. AUTHORITY, http://www.chfa.org/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/6VA2-
QFNE] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) (providing information about various programs administered by the 
CHFA). To qualify for each of these programs, a purchaser’s household income must fall below the 
income level specified for his or her geographic location. See CONN. HOUSING FIN. AUTHORITY, 
INCOME LIMITS (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.chfa.org/content/CHFA%20Documents/Income%
0and%20Sales%20Price%20Limits%20rev.%208-14-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/797A-PY55] (specifying the 
income limits, based on family size and geographic location, needed to qualify for certain CHFA mortgage 
assistance programs). 
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position. The income and asset rules governing eligibility for these programs 
are often means-tested, creating cliff effects similar to those discussed above.205 
An individual’s effective marginal tax rate is the amount by which $1 of income 
increases not just federal tax liability, but the individual’s net economic position 
taking direct transfer programs into account.206 A cliff effect occurs when a 
differential change in some characteristic of an individual taxpayer (or some 
third party) results in an effective marginal tax rate of greater than 100%. 
Many of these programs, such as TANF,207 Section 8,208 SNAP,209 and 
certain child care subsidies210 are implemented at the state and local level but 
are funded primarily by the federal government. Provided that state 
guidelines satisfy certain minimum federal requirements, states have great 
discretion in deciding how to implement programs in their respective 
jurisdictions. For example, Alabama has no asset limit for TANF applicants, 
but in Georgia $1000 in a savings account renders an applicant ineligible.211 
As a result, effective marginal tax rates vary greatly based on state of 
 
The San Francisco Down Payment Assistance Loan Program, which provides down payment and 
closing cost assistance, is only available to households in which income does not exceed 120% of the area 
median for the San Francisco Metropolitan Statistical Area. Downpayment Assistance Loan Project (DALP), 
MAYOR’S OFFICE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.sf-moh.org/index.aspx?page=737 
[https://perma.cc/KM5A-7635] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). In addition, the household’s combined liquid 
assets cannot exceed $200,000 before or $60,000 after purchase of the home. Id. 
205 See supra Section II.D. 
206 The term “effective marginal tax” rate is somewhat of a misnomer. See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
207 See HUBER AT AL., supra note 204, at 1 (“While TANF is a federally funded program, the 
specific policies governing eligibility status and benefit levels are determined at the state level, 
within the overall structure established by the federal legislation.”). 
208 See Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 
[https://perma.cc/DRP3-QK3A] (last visited Jan. 23, 2016) (explaining that Section 8 is funded by 
the federal government and is administered by local public housing authorities). 
209 See Regina T. Cucurullo, The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Comparing Policies and 
Suggesting Changes, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 257, 261-62 (2012) (“SNAP is implemented and carried 
out by both [the Food and Nutrition Service] and state agencies . . . . The federal government funds 
the cost of program benefits, and both state and federal governments provide funding for 
administrative costs.” (footnote omitted)). 
210 See, e.g., David M. Blau, Child Care Subsidy Programs, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER 
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 443, 445-51 (Robert A. Moffit ed., 2003) (explaining the 
structures of several child care subsidies, which are often arranged as federal block grants that are 
administered by states and localities). 
211 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 204, at 74-75 tbl.I.C.1 (describing each state’s asset limits for 
TANF eligibility, finding a range of $1000 to $10,000 for those states that have limits, and indicating 
that seven states have no asset limit). 
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residence.212 These state-administered benefits comprise a significant portion 
of the after-tax financial position of the typical low-income taxpayer.213 
The methodology described in Part IV to identify and remedy 
problematic cliff effects in the Internal Revenue Code can similarly be used 
at the state and local level. Instead of limiting the analysis to federal tax 
provisions, the statutes of interest should include state and local tax regimes 
and direct transfer programs. The general approach of identifying 
problematic cliff effects by balancing the goals of the relevant benefit 
provisions against the economic costs and simplicity gains of the associated 
cliff effects, and remedying the provisions as needed, is still effective. 
However, implementing this process at multiple levels of government 
involves certain challenges not present when working at just the federal level. 
First, the level of interaction between federal, state, and local provisions is 
typically much higher than for federal tax expenditures considered in isolation. 
For example, in some states, such as Massachusetts, income from public 
assistance programs is treated as countable income for purposes of determining 
SNAP eligibility.214 Other states include recipients of Social Security Insurance 
(SSI) in the TANF assistance unit; some of these states then include the SSI 
recipient’s income or assets when determining the TANF unit’s income or 
assets.215 These interactive effects between provisions make the computational 
tasks much more difficult than a federal tax provision reviewed in isolation. 
Second, any taxpayer subject to state and local cliff effects based on income 
is more likely to also be affected by cliff effects based on income in the Internal 
Revenue Code. At the federal, state, and local levels, cliff effects based on 
income typically affect low- to moderate-income taxpayers. If a taxpayer is 
subjected to an income-based cliff at one level, it is more likely they are also a 
taxpayer subjected to an income-based cliff effect at the other level. Phaseouts 
can replace cliff effects in all jurisdictions but this does not guarantee that a 
taxpayer will not suffer effective marginal tax rates greater than 100%.216 
Ensuring that taxpayers are not made worse off post-tax by earning additional 
pre-tax income requires a high level of coordination between the Internal 
Revenue Service and each state government. Such coordination, though 
 
212 Maag et al., supra note 130, at 769. 
213 See id. at 765 fig.1 (showing that for a single parent with two children in Colorado earning between 
$10,000 and $20,000 in income, state benefits received are approximately equal to household income). 
214 106 MASS. CODE REGS. § 363-220(B)(1) (2015). 
215 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 204, at 27 (finding that six states consider the income of SSI 
recipients when determining the amount of TANF funds an “assistance unit” can receive). 
216 See supra Section IV.C. 
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onerous, is not impossible; states currently coordinate certain elements of their 
state income tax in conjunction with federal income tax filing.217 
Third, although states are permitted to amend their eligibility criteria, 
much state funding for direct transfer programs comes from the federal 
government, which often does not provide sufficient funds to accommodate 
the phaseouts proposed in this Article. For example, TANF is funded by a 
block grant to the states that has not been increased since the mid-1990s.218 
To the extent that the most efficient modification of an existing cliff effect 
involves an extended phaseout income range or any other revenue increasing 
change, funding restrictions such as those in TANF could impede  
achieving the optimal adjustments. 
Fourth, unlike the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that result in 
an explicit increase or decrease of federal tax liability, state direct transfer 
programs do not always have an ascertainable dollar value. For example, 
SNAP funds must be used to purchase food for home consumption and 
cannot be used to purchase hot foods, food consumable within the store at 
which purchased, vitamins, or medicines.219 Vouchers provided for child care 
might not be equivalent to the cash a taxpayer would spend on child care on 
the open market. The valuation issues surrounding direct transfer programs 
could make the quantification of their associated cliff effects more challenging 
and, as a result, more difficult to correct. 
Nevertheless, while computing the impact on cliff effects may be 
complicated when they occur due to the interaction of federal, state, and/or 
local programs, such computations are generally possible. Moreover, 
converting cliff effects into phaseouts can be desirable even if the precise 
impact of the cliff effect cannot be calculated because under a phaseout, a 
taxpayer will never encounter a marginal tax rate over 100%. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has endeavored to critically assess the frequent use of cliff 
effects in the Internal Revenue Code and their consequences on low- to 
moderate-income taxpayers. When triggered by a taxpayer’s income, these 
 
217 The Internal Revenue Code permits deduction of state and local taxes. I.R.C. § 164 (2012). 
Many states also use federal adjusted gross income as an eligibility criterion for certain state benefits, 
such as the state Earned Income Tax Credit. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(h) (2015). 
218 See FALK, supra note 62, at 3 (explaining that the TANF grant is a result of a 1996 legislation 
that does not allow the grant to be adjusted for inflation or for influxes in the number of cash-
assistance caseloads). 
219 7 U.S.C. § 2012(k) (2012); see also Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP): Eligible 
Food Items, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligible-food-items [https://perma.cc/
PU4K-B6TT] (last updated July 18, 2014) (providing agency guidance on the types of items that can 
be purchased with SNAP funds). 
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provisions necessarily leave some taxpayers in a worse economic position than 
if they had earned less. These costs can be surprisingly high, as evidenced by 
an analysis of the cliff effects associated with the health premium subsidy of 
the Affordable Care Act. When the costs associated with cliff effects outweigh 
the gains obtained from the simplicity of bright-line rules, tax provisions should 
be rewritten to eliminate the cliff effect. Of special note is a guarantee that no 
taxpayer is made worse off post-tax simply by virtue of earning more pre-tax 
income. Such a restriction would guarantee low- to moderate-income earners a 
minimum return on any additional wages and is especially relevant for earners 
who are unable to control their income levels to optimize their tax liability. 
The analysis in this Article focuses on cliff effects in the Internal Revenue 
Code but has implications on cliff effects found in state and local direct 
transfer programs, as well. Similar to cliff effects in the Internal Revenue 
Code, the simplicity gains obtained from cliff effects associated with state and 
local tax regimes and direct transfer programs should be compared to the 
burdens imposed on taxpayers whose benefits are suddenly terminated. 
Cliff effects, even if designed to precisely define terms requiring clarity and 
promoting some desired behavior, should be used cautiously. Their use often 
undermines the intent of the statutes to which they are attached. The  
proposals of this Article to assess, measure, and remedy existing and proposed 
cliff effects are a step towards improving the equity and efficiency of  
benefits provided in the Internal Revenue Code, state and local tax regimes, and 
direct transfer programs. 
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